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I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of both the Rehabilitation Act of 19731
(Rehabilitation Act) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of
19902 (ADA) implemented broad measures designed to protect
individuals with disabilities. Specifically, two of the primary goals
of these federal statutes were to prevent discrimination against
disabled individuals seeking employment as well as to protect em-
ployees who became disabled . Because of the protections arising
under these antidiscrimination laws, covered employers may no
longer automatically dismiss an employee or applicant merely
based upon a physical or mental disability. Although many people
might be surprised to discover that these statutes do not exempt
certain professions or categories of jobs from their statutory pro-
tections, both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA apply with
equal force to all fields of employment. As a result of the common
misconception that law enforcement agencies virtually have free
reign regarding employment decisions, this Article addresses the
impact of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA on the employ-
ment practices of law enforcement agencies. Quite simply, no one
is above the law when it comes to complying with the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act-not even federal, state, or local law en-
forcement agencies.4
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimina-
tion against a qualified individual with a disability in regard to employment. See id.
§§ 12111-12117. Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination in regard to
state and local government services, see id. §§ 12131-12165, while Title III of the
ADA prohibits private parties who are providing public accommodation from dis-
criminating on the basis of disability. See id. §§ 12181-12189.
3. See, e.g., id. § 12101(a)(8) ("[T]he Nation's proper goals regarding individuals
with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency.").
4. In 1992 there were 12,502 local police departments, 3,086 sheriffs' depart-
ments, 49 primary state police departments, and 1,721 special police agencies funded
by state and local governments in the United States. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES,
1992, at 1 (1993) [hereinafter REAVES, CENSUS]. These agencies collectively em-
ployed "604,000 full-time sworn officers with general arrest powers and 237,000 non-
sworn civilian personnel." Id. As of June 30, 1993, local police departments em-
ployed approximately 373,554 sworn officers. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 1993, at 1 (1996) [hereinafter REAVES,
LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS]. Also, as of June 30, 1993, sheriffs' departments col-
lectively employed 224,236 full-time employees of which almost 156,000 were sworn
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II. GENERAL APPLICATION OF THE ADA
AND THE REHABILITATION ACT TO
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
A. Statutory Protections
In order to address the employment practices of law enforce-
ment agencies as they pertain to disabled individuals, it is impor-
tant to understand exactly what protections flow from the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act. Title I of the ADA states in pertinent
part: "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified in-
dividual with a disability because of the disability of such an indi-
vidual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, ad-
vancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment." Furthermore, Title II of the ADA states: "No quali-
fied individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity."6 Likewise, the Rehabilita-
tion Act states in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
personnel. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS,
1993, at 1 (1996) [hereinafter REAVES, SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS]. See generally
REAVES, CENSUS, supra, at 8 (ranking the 25 largest state and local law enforcement
agencies based on the number of full-time sworn officers). As of March 15, 1995, 680
campus law enforcement agencies serving U.S. 4-year colleges and universities with
2,500 or more students employed nearly 11,000 full-time sworn officers. BRIAN A.
REAVES, CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 1995, at 2 (1996) [hereinafter
REAVES, CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT].
As of December 1993 federal agencies employed approximately "69,000 full-
time personnel authorized to make arrests and carry firearms." BRIAN A. REAVES,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LAw ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 1993, at 1 (1994)
[hereinafter REAVES, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS]. Various federal
agencies employed the following personnel: 10,120 U.S. Customs Service inspectors
and criminal investigators; 10,075 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents;
9,984 Federal Bureau of Prison correctional officers; 9,466 Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) criminal investigators, inspectors, and Border Patrol agents;
3,621 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents; 3,587 postal inspectors and officers
with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service; 2,813 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
agents; 2,186 U.S. Secret Service agents; 2,153 deputies with the U.S. Marshals Serv-
ice; and 1,959 Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) agents. See id. at 1-3.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
6. Id. § 12132. The implementing regulations for Title II further declare, "No
qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be subjected to
discrimination in employment under any service, program, or activity conducted by a
public entity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(a) (1996).
[Vol. 30:977
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United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title,
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency ....
In effect, these statutory protections outlaw the intentional dis-
crimination or the disparate treatment of qualified individuals
solely because of their disability.8
Not only do the ADA and Rehabilitation Act prohibit overt
forms of discrimination, they also address more subtle forms of
disability discrimination. For example, facially neutral employ-
ment standards, which either impact or burden individuals with
disabilities more heavily than nondisabled individuals, are now
subject to scrutiny. As a means to deter employers from relying on
standards that have an unjustified disparate impact on individuals
with disabilities, the following provisions were incorporated into
Title I of the ADA:
[T]he term "discriminate" includes... utilizing standards,
criteria, or methods of administration... that have the ef-
fect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or... us-
ing qualifications standards, employment tests or other
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an
7. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 504(a), as amended by 29 U.S.C. §
794(a) (1994). Additionally, § 501(b) provides in pertinent part:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality... in the executive branch
shall ... submit ... an affirmative action program plan for the hiring,
placement, and advancement of individuals with disabilities in such de-
partment, agency, or instrumentality. Such plan shall ... provide... suffi-
cient assurances, procedures and commitments to provide adequate hiring,
placement, and advancement opportunities for individuals with disabilities.
Id. § 501(b), as amended by 29 U.S.C. § 791(b).
Although there is disagreement as to whether both § 501 and § 504 offer
remedies for federal employees alleging disability discrimination, there is support for
a plaintiff's reliance on both statutes. See, e.g., Hogarth v. Thornburgh, 833 F. Supp.
1077, 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing cases holding that "section 501 provides the ex-
clusive remedy," while also citing cases holding that § 501 and § 504 "provide over-
lapping protections" (citations omitted)); LAuRA F. ROTHsTEIN, DISABIIrIEs AND
THE LAW § 8.05 n.47 (1992).
8. Considering the similar language used in the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act, it is not unusual for a court to rely on relevant case law developed under either
statute when attempting to interpret a provision common to both laws. See, e.g., Al-
lison v. Department of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1996); White v. York
Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357,360 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939,
943 (10th Cir. 1994).
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individual with a disability or a class of individuals with
disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection cri-
teria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-
related for the position in question and is consistent with
business necessity .... 9
Although the Rehabilitation Act does not directly mention
disparate impact discrimination, it declares that the same stan-
dards applied under Title I of the ADA shall be used to determine
whether § 501 or § 504 have been violated." Consequently, all
employment policies and hiring criteria having a disparate impact
on individuals with disabilities must be job-related and consistent
with business necessity;' otherwise, the employer might find itself
unable to defend against allegations of disparate impact discrimi-1 2
nation. Even if the employer is able to show that the standard is
9. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A), (b)(6);
see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.7, 1630.10, 1630.11 (1996) (making it unlawful for a cov-
ered entity to use qualification standards or other selection criteria which are not
job-related and consistent with business necessity).
10. See 29 U.S.C. §8 791(g), 794(d). The administrative regulations for 29 U.S.C.
88 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act contain fairly similar disparate impact pro-
visions as those found in Title I and its accompanying regulations. See 28 C.F.R. §
42.512; 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a).
11. See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621-22 (9th
Cir. 1982) ("[T]he courts must be wary that business necessity is not confused with
mere expediency. If a job qualification is to be permitted to exclude handicapped
individuals, it must be directly connected with, and must substantially promote,
'business necessity and safe performance."'); Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 app. [hereinafter EEOC Interpretive Guidance] (explaining
that "It]he concept of 'business necessity' [as used in Title I of the ADA] has the
same meaning as the concept of 'business necessity' under section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973"). See generally Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986) (explaining that the EEOC interpretive guidelines "'while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."'
(citations omitted)); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n,
37 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1994) (following the reasoning in Meritor Savings Bank and
relying on the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 88 1630 app., 1630.10);
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (describing the avail-
able defenses to an allegation of disparate treatment or impact). It is important to
note that a finding of illegal, disparate impact discrimination can occur even in the
absence of any discriminatory intent on the part of the employer. See Mark A.
Schuman, The Wheelchair Ramp To Serfdom: The Americans With Disabilities Act,
Liberty, and Markets, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 495, 504 (1995); cf. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
("'Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate
impact theory."' (citation omitted)); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
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both job-related and consistent with business necessity, the em-
ployer still must be prepared to demonstrate that the individual
could not have met the standard with reasonable accommodation.
13
In some cases, failure to make reasonable accommodations for
the physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified indi-
vidual with a disability also can fall within the definition of illegal
discrimination. 14 In particular, employers are prohibited from dis-
criminating against a qualified individual with a disability by refus-
ing to make a reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can
demonstrate that the accommodation would result in undue hard-
ship by requiring significant difficulty or expense. 5 Examples of
reasonable accommodation may include all of the following:
"making existing facilities... readily accessible.., and usable,...
job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassign-
ment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of... ex-
aminations, training materials or policies... and other similar ac-
commodations." 6  Moreover, prohibited discrimination includes
denying employment opportunities in an attempt to avoid the need
to engage in reasonable accommodation. 7
B. Covered Entities
After reviewing the basic antidiscrimination mandates of the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the next step is to consider ex-
(1971) (explaining that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not re-
deem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in head-
winds').
13. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACr § 4.4 (1992) [hereinafter EEOC TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL]. See generally Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Ac-
commodation, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1969 (1994) (discussing reasonable accomodation).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also infra note 199 and accompanying
text (explaining that employers have an affirmative obligation to offer reasonable
accommodation).
15. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9)-(10), 12112(b)(5)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 41.53; 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1613.704, 1630.2(p), 1630.9. See generally Steven B. Epstein, In Search of A
Bright Line: Determining When An Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes
"Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391 (1995)
(analyzing the phrase "significant difficulty or expense"); Steven F. Stuhlbarg,
Comment, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act:
How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns Undue?, 59 CIN. L. REV. 1311
(1991) (discussing reasonable accommodation and undue hardship).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); see also 28 C.F.R. § 42.511(b); 29 C.F.R. §§
1613.704(b)(1)-(2), 1630.2(o) (describing reasonable accomodations).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
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actly what entities are covered by these statutes. Essentially, a law
enforcement agency cannot be subject to the provisions of the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act unless it falls within the statutory
scope of one of the two statutes.
According to Title I of the ADA, "[t]he term 'covered entity'
means an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee."' 8  Additionally, the term
"employer" generally means "a person engaged in an industry who
has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of the 20
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
and any agent of such person."'9 Due to these broad definitions, it
is very likely that most police and sheriffs' departments will fall
within the scope of Title I of the ADA.2' All state law enforce-
ment agencies will be covered because every state, with the excep-
tion of Hawaii, employs in excess of fifteen state troopers, depart-
ment of public safety officers, highway patrol officers, or state
police officers.2'
Somewhat ironically, the very first Title I discrimination law-
suit filed by the United States Department of Justice directly in-
volved the law enforcement community. 22 In United States v. Illi-
noise the Justice Department challenged two Illinois state laws
impacting the receipt of pension benefits by police officers and
firefighters.24 In particular, one of the challenged statutes enabled
local pension boards to exclude police officers with disabilities
from qualifying for any pension benefits, even in cases where em-
ploying municipalities already had determined that the same indi-
viduals were physically and mentally qualified for employment.Y
18. 111 § 12111(2).
19. Id. § 12111(5)(A).
20. It should be noted that because the ADA does not apply to federal employ-
ers, federal law enforcement agencies are not subject to the ADA. See id. §12111(5)(B)(i).
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS 1993: DATA FOR
INDIVIDUAL STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES WITH 100 OR MORE OFFICERS 24 (1995)
[hereinafter LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS].
22. See Linda Campbell et al., U.S. Sues Illinois to Put Teeth in Disabilities Act,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1993, (North ed.), at 1; Lynn Duke, Justice Dept. Sues Illinois,
City Under Disabilities Act, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1993, at Al; Andrew Gottesman,
Pension Chief Backs Exclusion of 2 Cops, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 1993, (Du Page ed.),
at 1.
23. No. CIV.93-7741,1994 WL 562180 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1994).
24. See id.
25. See id. at *1 (citing 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-106(2) (1985)). Kevin Holmes,
[Vol. 30:977
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As a result, it was possible for an individual to serve as a law en-
forcement officer and yet be ineligible for the receipt of any re-
tirement, disability, or survivor's benefits.
Although neither the State of Illinois nor the pension fund
board of trustees directly employed the affected officers, the court
refused to dismiss any of the plaintiff's Title I claims against these
two defendants.27 The court made this decision after concluding
that the state and the pension fund board of trustees each fell
within the Title I definition of a "covered entity."' For instance,
the state satisfied the literal definition of a covered entity based on
the fact it had more than fifteen of its own employees. 2 Further-
more, the pension fund board of trustees also qualified as a cov-
ered entity because it had acted as an agent on behalf of the em-
ploying municipality." Even if Title I had not been applicable, the
Justice Department could have sought relief under Title II of the
ADA.3 Ultimately, Illinois amended the relevant statute 2 and the
lawsuit settled with a consent decree.33
an Aurora police officer, was denied participation in the pension fund because he
was an insulin-dependent diabetic. See id. at *2.
26. See id. at *1. This situation meant that an officer, who was denied participa-
tion in the pension fund because of a preexisting disability, would receive no benefits
whatsoever following a life-altering injury incurred in the line of duty. See William J.
Eaton, U.S. Files First Suit Under Disabilities Act in Illinois, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29,
1993, at A8.
27. See United States v. Illinois, 1994 WL 562180, at *6.
28. See id. at *3-*4.
29. See id. at *3. The court explained, "There is no express requirement that the
covered entity be an employer of the qualified individual.... The ADA is silent as
to requiring a direct employment relationship for liability." Id. at *2-*3.
30. See id. at *3-*4.
31. See Holmes v. City of Aurora, No. CIV.93-0835, 1995 WL 21606 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 18, 1995) (addressing Officer Holmes's own lawsuit filed pursuant to Title II and
29 U.S.C. § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). But see Rodriguez v. City of Aurora, 887
F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (involving the Title II claims of another officer who was
denied eligibility to participate in the pension fund because of a back problem).
While prohibiting a public entity from engaging in disability discrimination,
Title II defines the term public entity as meaning, "(A) any State or local govern-
ment; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality
of a State or States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation, and any commuter authority.... ." Americans with Disabilites Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(C). Because of the broad scope of this definition,
Title II should apply to virtually every state and local police and sheriffs' department
within the United States.
32. See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-106 (West Supp. 1996).
33. See United States v. Illinois, No.93 C 7741 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1995) (consent
decree entered) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); see also William
Grady, Cops and Firefighters Breathe Sigh of Relief, CH. TRIB., Aug. 13, 1995, Metro
(Du Page ed.), at 1 (explaining the plight of Kevin Holmes and his suit); Lynn Sweet,
Arl1997]
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Unlike the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act potentially impacts
both federal and state law enforcement agencies. For example,
while the Rehabilitation Act applies directly to all federal agen-
cies, 4 it also affects recipients of federal financial assistance.35 As a
result of § 501 and § 504, all federal law enforcement agencies-for
example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA); the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms (ATF); the United States Customs Service;
the United States Secret Service; the United States Marshals
Service; the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS); the fifty-
seven offices of the Inspector General (OIG)-must comply with
the antidiscrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.36
Similarly, any state or local law enforcement agency receiving fed-
eral financial assistance also is required to comply with the Re-
habilitation Act.37
III. DISABILITIES UNDER THE ADA AND THE REHABILITATION
AcT
A. Statutorily Defining What Is a Covered Disability
Considering the fact that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act of-
fer broad protections for disabled individuals,38 it is extremely im-
portant to understand exactly what categories of individuals are
covered. The starting point is to turn to the statutes themselves for
guidance.
Disability Benefits Ruling to Aid Police, Firefighters, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995,
at 79 (explaining the agreement between the State of Illinois and the Justice De-
partment).
34. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 501, amended by 29 U.S.C. § 791
(1994).
35. See id. § 504, amended by 29 U.S.C. § 794.
36. See Salmon Pifieiro v. Lehman, 653 F. Supp. 483, 493 (D.P.R. 1987) ("The
NIS is part of the Navy, and as such, the NIS is a program or activity conducted by an
Executive agency and receives federal financial assistance."). It should be noted that
the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) has been renamed as the Naval Criminal In-
vestigate Service (NCIS).
37. See, e.g., Delmonte v. Department of Bus. & Prof l Regulation, 877 F. Supp.
1563, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (explaining that a state law enforcement agency's receipt
of training provided by the FBI, DEA, IRS, ATF, and the Secret Service was enough
to trigger § 504 coverage); Tanberg v. Weld County Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970, 974 (D.
Colo. 1992) (ruling that a county sheriff's department was subject to the Rehabilita-
tion Act because it qualified as a program receiving federal financial assistance).
38. Although the term "disabled" is considered to be more preferable than the
term "handicapped," many cases and statutes still rely on the term "handicapped."
[Vol. 30:977
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Before a law enforcement officer or applicant can rely on the
ADA, the individual first must be able to prove that he or she ac-
tually is disabled within the meaning of the law. One federal court
has explained, "Establishing that one is disabled is the cornerstone
to an ADA plaintiff's prima facie case."39 As a result, it is crucial
that a plaintiff fall within the statutory definition of the term
"disability" as contained in the ADA. According to the ADA,
"The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual-(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment." Unless one of the three stated conditions exists, an
individual will not be considered as being disabled; therefore, the
protections of the ADA will not apply.
Likewise, anyone seeking to rely on the Rehabilitation Act
must establish the existence of a disability as defined by that stat-
ute. In reference to this requirement, one court has declared, "As
the first element of a prima facie case of discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff must establish she is an 'individual
with a disability' under the terms of the Act.,
41
Almost identical to the ADA definition of the term disability,
the Rehabilitation Act states that an "individual with a disability
means.., any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is re-
garded as having such an impairment. ' 42 In the event an individual
is unable to demonstrate that the physical or mental condition in
question falls within the above-mentioned definition, the Rehabili-
tation Act will offer no protection.
In addition to the two stated definitions of what constitutes a
disability, it is necessary to understand what legally amounts to a
physical or mental impairment substantially limiting one or more
major life activities. This is a key issue considering the fact that
"[d]isability determinations often turn on whether the impairment
39. Fussell v. Georgia Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1567 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
40. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
41. Lawrence v. Metro-Dade Police Dep't, 872 F. Supp. 950, 954 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(citing Plummer ex rel. Plummer v. Branstad, 731 F.2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1984)); see
Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983); Joyner ex reL
Lowry v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770,774 (2d Cir. 1983).
42. Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
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substantially limits a 'major life activity."' 43
To explain what amounts to a substantial limitation of a major
life activity, one should look for assistance to the administrative
agencies that have confronted this issue.44 When the ADA was
passed, Congress directed the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to issue whatever administrative regulations
were necessary to implement Title I of the ADA.4 As a result, the
EEOC has articulated specific factors to consider when attempting
to determine whether an impairment substantially limits a major
life activity: "(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii)
The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The
permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or
long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 4 1 Moreo-
ver, the implementing regulations for Title I also state, "Major
Life Activities means functions such as caring for oneself, perform-
ing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working."47 Not too surprisingly, regulations imple-
menting § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act rely on the same criteria
when defining what amounts to a major life activity.
4
43. Fussell, 906 F. Supp. at 1568.
44. See Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The
ADA defines neither 'substantially limits' nor 'major life activities,' but the regula-
tions promulgated by the EEOC under the ADA provide significant guidance.
These regulations adopt the same definition of major life activities as used in the
Rehabilitation Act." (citing Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994)).
45. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12116. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 established the EEOC as an independent, federal govern-
ment agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4. Besides enforcing the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the EEOC is also responsible for enforcing such other federal laws as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), the Equal Pay Act of 1963
(EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (ADEA); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(EPA); 29 U.S.C. § 791 (Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12119 (ADA).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii) (1996).
47. 1d § 1630.2(h)(2)(i). The implementing regulations for Title II, as promul-
gated by the Department of Justice, offer a similar definition. See 28 C.F.R. §
35.104(4)(I)(i)-(ii) (1996).
Additionally, the EEOC defines "substantially limits" as meaning the following:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or... (ii) Significantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or du-
ration under which the average person in the general population can per-
form that same major life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii).
48. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(k)(2)(ii); 31 C.F.R. § 17.103 (0(2) (1996).
NO ONE IS ABOVE THE LAW
B. Judicially Interpreting What Is a Covered Disability
Although both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act offer basic
definitions of what constitutes a covered disability, judicial deci-
sions offer additional guidance. There currently are only a limited,
but steadily increasing, number of cases in which courts specifically
have determined that a particular physical condition of a law en-
forcement officer or applicant qualifies him or her as an individual
with a disability.49
Despite the small number of judicial opinions addressing
whether a particular impairment of a law enforcement officer or
applicant amounts to a covered disability, the existing cases do of-
fer valuable insight into what conditions are viewed as substan-
tially limiting a major life activity.5 For instance, one court ac-
knowledged that an applicant for the position of special agent with
the FBI was disabled because he was an insulin-dependent dia-
betic.51 Likewise, a former criminal investigator with the Naval In-
49. Although numerous cases engage in general analysis of the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA in regards to law enforcement employment, only a handful in-
volve specific judicial determinations that an individual is disabled.
Because the disability status of the plaintiff commonly is not at issue and be-
cause courts frequently focus upon whether an individual is "otherwise qualified,"
there often is little discussion as to whether the individual is actually disabled. See,
e.g., Lassiter v. Reno, No. 95-2058, 1996 WL 281933 (4th Cir. May 29, 1996)
(explaining that because a deputy marshal suffered from a delusional paranoid dis-
order, the Attorney General did not dispute that the United States Marshals Service
regarded him as being disabled), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 766 (1997); Champ v. Balti-
more County, 884 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Md. 1995) (noting that parties did not dis-
pute that former police officer, who suffered from a "100% loss in the use of his left
upper arm," was disabled), aff'd, 91 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 1996); Ryan v. City of High-
land Heights, 4 A.D. Cases 1389 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (defendants did not dispute the
disability status of a reserve police officer, who had a metal rod and pins placed in his
leg after he was injured while directing traffic); Dorris v. City of Kentwood, No.
CIV.1:94-249, 1994 WL 762219 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 4, 1994) (City of Kentwood did not
dispute that an officer with degenerative joint disease in both knees was disabled).
50. See, e.g., Woodson v. Cook County Sheriff, No. CIV.96-3864, 1996 WL
604051, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 1996) (concluding that a deputy sheriff's ADA claim
that she suffers from the alleged disability of chronic fatigue syndrome is sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss); Silk v. City of Chicago, No. CIV.95-0143, 1996 WL
312074, at *16 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1996) (ruling that a Chicago police officer's allega-
tion that his sleep apnea substantially limits his breathing is sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss); Madden v. Runyon, 899 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying a
defense motion for summary judgment after concluding that there was a material is-
sue as to whether a postal inspector's back spasms limited a major life activity).
51. See Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("An insulin-
dependent diabetic is clearly a 'handicapped person' within the meaning of the Re-
habilitation Act."), affd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989).
In another case involving the FBI, a court determined that a former clerk
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vestigative Service was classified as disabled under the Rehabilita-
tion Act because he had epilepsy, which had caused him to experi-
ence at least four seizures. 2 While reviewing the demotion of an
alcoholic detective with the New York City Police Department, a
federal court acknowledged that "it is clear that alcoholism is a
disability under the Rehabilitation Act." 3 In another case a fed-
eral court found that a security guard applicant, who had only one
hand, had a disability according to the court's interpretation of the
ADA.! Additionaly,.a police officer applicant, who had experi-
enced as many as five dislocations of his right shoulder over the
course of his life, was held to be disabled.55 A correctional officer,
who practically became blind in both eyes due to injuries sustained
from an automobile accident, was "obviously... substantially lim-
ited in the major life activity of seeing... [so as to be considered]
disabled for purposes of the ADA."' 6 Although there is not an
abundance of law-enforcement-related cases holding that a par-
ticular physical or mental condition constitutes a covered disabil-
ity, there are many cases outside of the realm of law enforcement
that offer further guidance on this issue.s
with a bipolar disorder was a "handicapped individual" as defined by the Rehabili-
tation Act. See Hogarth v. Thornburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077,1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). At
different times, this individual developed "bizarre ideas." Id. For example, he
thought the CIA wanted him to be an operative in Africa; he submitted false medical
excuses; he believed he was a doctor; he "believed that he was receiving coded mes-
sages from the CIA over the radio"; and "he called the Strategic Air Command in
Omaha to issue a warning" that a nuclear attack was about to occur. Id. at 1080.
52. See Salmon Pifieiro v. Lehman, 653 F. Supp. 483, 490 (D.P.R. 1987); see also
Vazquez v. Bedsole, 888 F. Supp. 727, 731 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (finding that a sheriffs
deputy suffering from periodic epileptic seizures was disabled under the ADA).
53. Dimonda v. New York City Police Dep't, No. CIV.94-0840, 1996 WL 194325,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1996). For purposes of § 504, the term "individual with a
disability," does not include anyone whose current use of alcohol prevents the indi-
vidual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose alcohol abuse
would constitute a direct threat. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 504,
amended by 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(v) (1994). For purposes of both § 501 and § 504,
the term does not include current users of illegal drugs. See id. § 706(8)(C)(i).
54. See Stillwell v. Kansas City, Mo. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 872 F. Supp. 682, 685
(W.D. Mo. 1995).
55. See Mahoney v. Ortiz, 645 F. Supp. 22,24 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
56. Miller v. Department of Corrections, 916 F. Supp. 863, 866 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
While people are legally blind if they have 20/200 vision, the plaintiff in this case had
20/800 vision. See id. at 866 n.2. In another case involving a correctional officer, an
allegation that asthma is a covered disability was enough to survive a defense motion
to dismiss. See Muller v. Costello, No. CIV.94-842,1996 WL 191977, at *5 (N.D.N.Y.
Apr. 16, 1996).
57. See, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987)
("[A] person suffering from the contagious disease of tuberculosis can be a handi-
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C. Judicially Interpreting What Is Not a Covered Disability
Unlike the comparatively limited number of cases holding that
a specific physical condition of a law enforcement officer or appli-
cant constitutes a disability, there are numerous judicial decisions
explaining what types of conditions experienced by such individu-
als do not amount to covered disabilities.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
one of many courts holding that a law enforcement applicant failed
to possess a disability covered by one of the federal antidiscrimi-
nation disability laws. The Second Circuit confronted this issue af-
ter an applicant with the New York City Police Department was
rejected because of "'poor judgment, irresponsible behavior and
poor impulse control."' 59 Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that he
was entitled to protection under the Rehabilitation Act, the court
held as follows:
"[P]oor judgment, irresponsible behavior and poor im-
pulse control" do not amount to a mental condition that
Congress intended to be considered an impairment which
substantially limits a major life activity and therefore a
person having those traits or perceived as having those
traits cannot be considered a handicapped person within
capped person within the meaning of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.");
Klein v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 19 F.3d 1433 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining that can-
cer is a disability).
58. See, e.g., Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F. 3d 2520 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that 76 law
enforcement officers with the Ohio State Highway Patrol were not disabled under
either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act merely because they were somewhat
overweight); Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1388-89 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding a
sheriff's department sergeant, who suffered from "tennis elbow" following a car ac-
cident while on patrol, was not a person with a disability), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 190
(1995); DeWitt v. Carsten, 941 F. Supp. 1232, 1236-37 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (concluding
that a sheriff's deputy was not disabled under the ADA, despite claims of extreme
stress caused by dealing with jail inmates and her boss, the sheriff); Williams v. City
of Charlotte, 899 F. Supp. 1484, 1487-88 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that a police offi-
cer with a sleep disorder had no disability under the ADA); Thompson v. City of
Arlington, 838 F. Supp. 1137, 1151-52 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (ruling that a police officer
suffering from depression was not disabled under the ADA); Capitano v. State, 875
P.2d 832 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that a correctional officer applicant with
mild to moderate high frequency hearing loss was not substantially impaired in any
major life activity for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act).
59. Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212,214 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Dr. Ernest Adams).
Dr. Adams' conclusion was based in part upon the applicant having indicated that he
had held more than three jobs in the preceding two years. See id. at 213. See gener-
ally Kimberli R. Black, Personality Screening in Employment, 32 AM. BUS. L. J. 69,
116 (1994) (discussing Daley v. Koch).
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the meaning of the [Rehabilitation] Act.6'
Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the applicant's
claim under the Rehabilitation Act.6'
In Paegle v. Department of the Interior6 a federal police offi-
cer with the United States Park Police sought relief under § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. The officer brought suit after his promo-
tion to patrol sergeant was delayed approximately nine months
while he served in a "limited duty" status.63 The officer was unable
to perform his ordinary duties because of a back injury that had
been reaggravated while he was making an arrest.6 After pointing
out that "[i]t is well established that the [Rehabilitation] Act was
never intended to extend to persons suffering from temporary
conditions or injuries," the court concluded that the officer was not
disabled so as to be covered by the protections of the Rehabilita-
tion Act.6" Basically, the officer had failed to show that he suffered
from anything more than a temporary injury.
Likewise, summary judgment was granted in another case in-
volving a temporary disability.6 In Layser v. Morrison6 the plain-
60. Daley, 892 F.2d at 215.
61. See id. at 216; see also Greenberg v. New York, 919 F. Supp. 637, 643
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a correction officer applicant was not disabled under
the ADA merely because he was viewed as having poor judgment); Gardiner v.
Mercyhurst College, 942 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (concluding that an
applicant for a police training program, who suffered from immaturity and emotional
stress, was not disabled under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act).
62. 813 F. Supp. 61 (D.D.C. 1993).
63. See id. at 62-63.
64. See id. at 62-63 & n.1.
65. Id at 64. The court also rejected plaintiffs argument that he was "regarded
as" disabled because the evidence indicated "that the Park Police placed him on
limited duty with the expectation that he would soon recover." Id. at 65.
66. See Layser v. Morrison, 935 F. Supp. 562, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1995). It should be
noted that the court based its holding on the premise that the alleged employment
discrimination occurred prior to the ADA taking affect on July 26, 1992. See id. at
567. Additionally, the court stated that the plaintiff's suit must also be barred due to
his failure to file a timely complaint with the EEOC. See id. Despite such a position,
the court went on to analyze the application of the ADA to the plaintiff's claim. See
id. at 568-69.
Unless a plaintiff files a charge with the EEOC complaining of disability dis-
crimination, no ADA suit can be filed in federal court. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Mur-
ray, 946 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (dismissing an ADA claim against the Chicago
Housing Authority Police Department because the plaintiff failed to file a charge
with the EEOC). In most cases, the required charge must be filed within 180 days.
See Whitekiller v. Campbell Soup, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 614, 615 (W.D. Ark. 1996)
(explaining that because the ADA incorporates by reference the remedies and pro-
cedures of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an ADA complaint must be filed
in compliance with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)). Similarly, anyone
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tiff was a university security officer who was believed to be suffer-
ing from temporary work-related stress and depression.68 Initially
the officer had been removed from patrol duty and placed on leave
for approximately three months.6 Following his initial three
month reassignment, the officer was reassigned to an unarmed dis-
patcher position for six more months before he was allowed to re-
sume patrol duty.70 Because of his temporary removal from patrol
duty, he alleged that his employer had discriminated against him
on the basis of his having a perceived disability.71 The court, how-
ever, rejected the officer's argument with the following explana-
tion: "Even if [the officer] could argue he suffered from a disabil-
ity, it was too temporary to warrant relief under the ADA because
[his employer] only removed him from active duty for approxi-
mately three months."
Furthermore, in numerous disability cases related to law en-
forcement employment, plaintiffs have attempted to allege that
various physical or mental conditions were covered disabilities due
to interference with their ability to work. A plaintiff often is
forced to resort to this argument because the physical or mental
condition at issue does not clearly affect (substantially limit) an-
other major life activity such as "caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, [or]
learning."73 One such case, for example, involved a police officer
alleging that a federal agency has engaged in disability discrimination must file an
administrative complaint with the offending agency. See, e.g., Lovell v. United
States, 794 F. Supp. 584 (W.D. Va. 1992) (granting a motion to dismiss because an
FBI applicant had failed to file a timely discrimination complaint with the FBI), aff'd
995 F.2d 1063 (4th Cir. 1993). Federal employees and applicants must bring a dis-
ability complaint to the attention of one of the EEO counselors within 45 days of the
date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1)
(1996). See generally Mark D. Laponsky, Procedural Problems and Considerations in
Representing Federal Employees in Equal Employment Opportunity Disputes, 29
How. L.J. 503 (1986) (offering helpdul guidance for attorneys representing plaintiffs
in disability discrimination disputes against federal agencies).
67. 935 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
68. See id. at 565. The officer was placed on leave after his doctor promptly re-
vealed that the officer had described a dream in which "he walked into [his supervi-




71. See id. at 565.
72. Id. at 569.
73. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i).
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applicant with uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200.74 Although the
applicant's general ability to see was not substantially limited, his
eyesight still disqualified him from every law enforcement position
in the state of New York, including that of a corrections officer. 5
Despite this broad disqualification, the court held that the plaintiff
was not disabled.76 Seemingly, such plaintiffs appear to be fighting
an uphill battle."
In order to determine whether a physical or mental condition
substantially interferes with working, many courts focus on the
applicable implementing regulations of either the ADA or 'the
Rehabilitation Act:
74. See Joyce v. Suffolk County, 911 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Daniel
Wise, Handicapped Claim for Police Job Fails: Condition Not Covered by Federal
Laws, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1996, at 1 (describing Joyce). Although the plaintiff's visual
acuity without corrective lenses was 20/200, his vision in each eye was correctable to
20/20. See Joyce, 911 F. Supp. at 93. Regardless, the Suffolk County Police Depart-
ment required that "uncorrected visual acuity for police officer candidates be no
worse than 20/40 in each eye." Id.
75. See Joyce, 911 F. Supp. at 95. But see Sicard v. City of Sioux City, 950 F.
Supp. 1420 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (concluding that there is a genuine issue of material
fact that a firefighter applicant's 20/200 uncorrected vision substantially limits major
life activities).
76. See Joyce, 911 F. Supp. at 98. Shortly after the dismissal of this case, New
York "issued a new set of guidelines... [wherein] uncorrected vision can be as im-
paired as 20/100 uncorrected and 20/30 corrected." Robin Topping, Disability Act
Doesn't Hit the Hiring of Cops-Yet, NEWSDAY, Feb. 6, 1996, at A44; see also Bar-
bara Carmen, Council Moves to Close Problem Liquor Sellers, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Dec. 19, 1995, at 3C (reporting that the city of Columbus decided to
change its vision requirements after it "[a]greed to pay $31,619 to settle a lawsuit"
filed by a police officer applicant who alleged "the city's 20/40 eyesight requirement
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act").
In another case a Torrington, Connecticut, police officer applied for a posi-
tion as a Connecticut state police trooper trainee. See Venclauskas v. Connecticut
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 921 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D. Conn. 1995). The officer's application
was rejected because he could not meet the minimum standard of 20/30 unaided vis-
ual acuity in each eye. See id The officer's unaided visual acuity was 20/120 in his
right eye and 20/80 in his left eye. See id. The court rejected the officer's claims that
he was substantially limited in his abilities to see, drive, and work. See id. at 81-82.
77. A plaintiff would be well-advised to avoid basing a disability claim on the
single argument that the disputed condition substantially interferes with working. In
the ideal case this argument only should be used to supplement allegations that other
major life activities are also affected by the condition. Regardless, a plaintiff must
almost always emphasize how the condition affects another major life activity be-
sides working. See, e.g., Bumstead v. Jasper County, 931 F. Supp. 1323, 1336-38
(E.D. Tex. 1996) (concluding that a deputy sheriff with prostate cancer was not dis-
abled under the Rehabilitation Act, after the plaintiff apparently based his disability
argument on the allegation "that defendants viewed plaintiff as possessing a handi-
cap which significantly affected his ability to engage in a major life activity, work").
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With respect to the major life activity of working... [t]he
term substantially limits means significantly restricted in
the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the aver-
age person having comparable training, skills and abili-
ties. The inability to perform a single, particular job does
not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life ac-
tivity of working.78
Subsequently, several courts have refused to hold that preclusion
from one particular job amounts to a substantial limitation on
one's ability to work. Moreover, a handful of courts even have
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the following fac-
tors may be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited
in the major life activity of "working":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impair-
ment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or
abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impair-
ment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowl-
edge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is
also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
IL § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).
79. See Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995)
("'[W]orking' does not mean working at a particular job of that person's choice. 'An
impairment that disqualifies a person from only a narrow range of jobs is not consid-
ered a substantially limiting one."' (quoting Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d
718, 723 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1095 (1995))); Dutcher v. Ingalls Ship-
building, 53 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that because a welder's "injured
arm adversely affects only the functioning in a welding position requiring substantial
climbing," the plaintiff failed to offer adequate "evidence that her impairment sub-
stantially limited a major life activity"); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 944
(10th Cir. 1994) (ruling that a discharged order selector in a grocery warehouse, who
suffered an on-the-job injury, "failed to produce evidence showing a significant re-
striction in his 'ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes' (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i))); Heilweil, 32 F.3d at 723-24
(holding that a terminated blood bank employee, whose asthma was made worse by
specific chemicals used at the blood banking facility, was medically restricted only
from working in this one place; therefore, her ability to work was not substantially
limited); Gupton v. Virginia, 14 F.3d 203, 204-05 (4th Cir. 1994) (a highway utility
specialist, whose allergy to smoke rendered her unable to work in an office that
permitted smoking, failed to present "evidence that her allergy foreclosed her gen-
erally from obtaining jobs in her field"); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 565
(7th Cir. 1992) ("It is well established that an inability to perform a particular job for
a particular employer is not sufficient to establish a handicap; the impairment must
substantially limit employment generally." (citing E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F.
Supp. 1088, 1099-100 (D. Haw. 1980))); Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419
(10th Cir. 1992) (stating that "an impairment that an employer perceives as limiting
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held that a physical or mental condition that is deemed to prevent
someone from serving in any capacity as a police officer, sheriff's
deputy, or federal agent does not necessarily mean that the person
is disabled. While taking an extremely liberal view of what con-
stitutes working in law enforcement, one court went so far as to
state that a dismissed, overweight Virginia State Trooper was not
"substantially limited as required by both the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA" because she was retained as a dispatcher in her oc-
cupational "field of law enforcement as a whole. '
Despite the breadth of case law refusing to accept the argu-
ment that preclusion from one particular job amounts to a sub-
stantial limitation on one's ability to work, courts must remember
that this is not the only standard for determining whether an indi-
vidual has a covered disability.2 Simply because a condition does
not substantially limit the major life activity of working, a court
cannot automatically conclude that the individual does not have a
an individual's ability to perform only one job is not a handicap under the
[Rehabilitation] Act"); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a utility systems repair person with acrophobia failed to establish that he was
handicapped as he was only disqualified from one particular position that required
him to climb ladders); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1247-50
(6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff with a mild case of crossed eyes was not "a
handicapped person within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)" because the condition
previously had not interfered with "his past work history and ability to carry out
other duties at the post office apart from operation of [one particular machine]").
80. See Daley, 892 F.2d at 215 ("Being declared unsuitable for the particular po-
sition of police officer is not a substantial limitation of a major life activity."); Layser,
935 F. Supp. at 568-69 (although an officer with depression was removed from patrol
duty, he was retained as a dispatch officer; therefore, his inability to perform one
particular job did not render him substantially limited in the activity of working);
Joyce, 911 F. Supp. at 96-98 (stating that "[t]he need for corrective eyewear in no
way substantially limits the plaintiffs employment generally"; as a result, this plain-
tiff with poor eyesight could not demonstrate that he was regarded as "impaired in a
way that substantially limits a major life activity"); Fussell v. Georgia Ports Auth.,
906 F. Supp. 1561, 1573 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (a dismissed Georgia Ports Authority police
officer suffering from hand tremors was not disabled as he was among those "only
unable to perform either a particular specialized job or a narrow range of jobs");
Sanford v. Steam, No. CIV.5:91-0650, 1992 WL 436327, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 10,
1992) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act claim of a plaintiff, who injured his knee
during a sheriffs department training program, failed because he did not "allege that
his injury prevented him from participating in activities other than the sheriff's rigor-
ous self-defense course."), affd, 980 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1992).
81. Smaw v. Virginia Dep't of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469, 1475 (E.D. Va.
1994). But cf Morrow v. City of Jacksonville, 941 F. Supp. 816, 819, 823 (E.D. Ark.
1996) (concluding that it is a question of fact for a jury to decide whether a
"'markedly obese' juvenile officer was substantially limited in the activity of work-
ing).
82. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
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covered disability; working is just one of the many major life ac-
tivities that could be affected by the individual's condition.83 For
instance, a condition still qualifies as a covered disability if it sub-
stantially limits any one of the other various major life activities; in
other words, it is not necessary for a condition to substantially
limit more than one major life activity in order to qualify as a cov-
ered disability. 4
In Burke v. Virginia,85 however, the court completely aban-
doned the statutory and regulatory language of the ADA when it
considered the disability discrimination claim of a terminated cor-
rections officer. In this case the Virginia Department of Correc-
tions (Virginia DOC) hired the plaintiff as a correctional officer.86
Afterwards, the Virginia DOC required the plaintiff to receive
training and obtain certification as a correctional officer.s The
plaintiff was unable to obtain certification because he could not
pass the required tests." Evidently, the plaintiff's inability to per-
form at an acceptable level was related to his suffering from
"Attention Deficit Disorder and Hyperactivity Disorder and De-
velopmental Expressive and Receptive Language Disorder."89 Af-
ter learning of the plaintiff's condition, the Virginia DOC con-
cluded that the plaintiff was not qualified to serve as a correctional
officer. Meanwhile, the Virginia DOC offered the plaintiff alter-
native employment.91
Despite the plaintiff's condition, the defendant's summary
judgment motion was granted as the trial court decided that the
plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA. The court apparently
misconstrued the legal argument that preclusion from one law en-
forcement position is not a substantial limitation on the major life
activity of working.92 Specifically, the court seemed to believe that
case law holds "that the inability to perform a single, particular job
83. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 40, 42 and accompanying text.
85. 938 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Va. 1996).
86. See id. at 321.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. ld. at 323.
90. See id. at 322.
91. See id. For example, the defendant "offered the [plaintiff] the position of
Motor Vehicle Operator B." Id This alternative position paid the "same salary as
the correctional officer position." Id. The plaintiff accepted an undisclosed alter-
nate position at a correctional center but later resigned. See id.
92. See id.
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does not constitute substantial limitation of major life activity." 93
This belief possibly resulted from the fact that the court confused
the phrase "life activity" with the more appropriate term of "major
life activity of working."9 4 Consequently, the court inaccurately
summarized case law and concluded, "The case at bar requires the
same result because the DOC provided Burke [the plaintiff] with
comparable, alternative positions, defeating any claim of impaired
life activity. Therefore, the Court finds that Burke does not have a
disability within the meaning of the ADA."95 Due to the court's
misinterpretation of existing case law, the court failed to even
consider whether "Attention Deficit Disorder and Hyperactivity
Disorder and Developmental Expressive and Receptive Language
Disorder" substantially limit the major life activity of learning.
In contrast to Burke v. Virginia, the court in Lawrence v.
Metro-Dade Police Department" demonstrated how to properly
reach the conclusion that an individual does not have a covered
disability." In the Lawrence case a police sergeant suffering from
"hammer toes," as well as lower back irritation caused by wearing
a gun belt, brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act.? After con-
sidering the plaintiff's argument that she was disabled because
"her feet and spine substantially limited her ability to work, '... the
93. Id
94. Id. at 323. For example, the court summarized one case by stating, "The
Fourth Circuit found that [the plaintiff's] life activity was not substantially limited as
she was not barred from law enforcement generally." Id. (citing Hughes v. Bedsole,
48 F.3d 1376 (4th Cir. 1995)) (emphasis added). The court summarized a second
case in a similar manner: "[T]he Court found that her life activity was not substan-
tially impaired because the plaintiff was still able to perform duties in the field of law
enforcement." Id (citing Smaw v. Virginia Dep't of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469)
(E.D. Va. 1994)) (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. Id This case is offered only for the purpose of demonstrating how not to de-
termine whether an individual has a covered disability. Of course, an individual with
a disability would still be required to demonstrate that he or she is otherwise quali-
fied. In Burke the court went on to conclude that the plaintiff was not otherwise
qualified because he could not "adequately perform one of the essential functions of
the correctional officer position-being able to read and comprehend written and
oral instructions in potentially life threatening situations." Id.; see also DeLeo v.
City of Stamford, 919 F. Supp. 70, 71 n.1 (D. Conn. 1995) (involving a terminated
police officer's claims "that his dyslexia substantially limits his ability to read and
write, and that this limitation renders him 'disabled' under 29 U.S.C. 706(8)").
97. 872 F. Supp. 950 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
98. See id.
99. See id at 952.
100. Id. at 954.
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court explained that in order "[t]o determine whether a physical
impairment substantially limits an individual's ability to work so as
to constitute a disability under the Rehabilitation Act, the Courts
must evaluate the impairment with respect to the actual em-
ployee."'' After considering evidence that the plaintiff's physical
conditions neither substantially interfered with her ability to work
as a police officer nor substantially limited any other aspects of her
life, the court concluded that there was "absolutely no evidence in
the record to indicate Plaintiff's physical impairments substantially
limited any major life activities."1 As a result, the court deter-
mined that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act; therefore, the Act could provide no relief
against the Metro-Dade Police Department's requirement that
plaintiff "wear the standard gun belt."103
Before blindly following existing case law or too narrowly
applying the ADA and Rehabilitation Act in law enforcement
cases, courts must begin to take a deeper look at these two federal
laws. For example, courts must determine whether the position of
police officer is truly its own job classification in and of itself, or
whether it is merely one of the many possible jobs in the field of
law enforcement.! 4 Unquestionably, many people would argue
that being a police officer, sheriff's deputy, or federal agent is a far
cry from being a radio dispatcher, file clerk, or secretary in a law
enforcement agency. If each of these positions is interpreted as
being nothing more than one single job in the broad field of law
enforcement, law enforcement agencies seemingly would be free
to turn away numerous disabled individuals by claiming that (1)
each person is being rejected only for one particular job in the
broad field of law enforcement, and (2) he or she generally is ca-
pable of obtaining employment elsewhere.0 s Additionally, law en-
101. IL at 955.
102. Id. at 956. In the plaintiff's deposition she admitted "that her back condition
did not interfere with 'standing, walking, running, exercising, driving, doing house
work, [or] yard work."' lId
103. Id.
104. See E.E. Black, Ltd., 497 F. Supp. at 1101-02 (D. Haw. 1980) ("Certainly, if
an applicant were disqualified from an entire field, there would be a substantial
handicap to employment. But, questions as to subfields and the like must be an-
swered on a case-by-case basis, after examining all the factors.... ." Such factors in-
clude the number and types of jobs from which the impaired individual is disquali-
fied; the geographical area to which the applicant has access; and the individual's
training and personal expectations.).
105. Such claims are contingent on the individual not possessing a disability sub-
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forcement agencies would have less accountability and greater
freedom to erroneously regard anyone with only limited impair-
ment as being incapable of serving as a law enforcement officer-
arguably because other employers would not take the same erro-
neous position; thereby, foreclosing a plaintiff's claim that he or
she was substantially limited in his or her ability to work.
Based on current case law, law enforcement officers and ap-
plicants need to realize that courts are rather narrowly interpreting
what constitutes a protected disability in cases involving law en-
forcement positions. Considering the consequences of such a ju-
dicial approach, it seems somewhat more appropriate for courts to
adopt an open-minded attitude towards defining what is a covered
disability, while taking a more conservative posture towards defin-
ing who is an otherwise qualified individual. Maybe this approach
would amount to doing nothing more than "giving with one hand
and taking away with the other"; but it at least would afford those
individuals, who are regarded as being medically disqualified, the
opportunity to demonstrate that they are actually capable of per-
forming the essential functions of the job.
If courts begin to somewhat more broadly interpret who
qualifies as having a covered disability, law enforcement agencies
will have less freedom to routinely turn away those applicants
failing to meet existing standards which are of questionable value;
for instance, rejecting all individuals whose uncorrected vision is
worse than 20/40.'0' Short of demonstrating that the questioned
stantially limiting a major life activity other than working; otherwise, the protections
of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act would still apply.
106. See Richard N. Holden, Vision Standards for Law Enforcement A Descrip-
tive Study, 12 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 125, 126 (1984) (stating that "[a]gencies with
more applications than they can handle are often tempted to raise vision standards
just to reduce qualified applicants"); see also Richard N. Holden, Eyesight Standards:
Correcting Myths, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., June 1993, at 1 (explaining that
there is no consensus either within law enforcement or the academic community re-
garding uncorrected vision standards). Compare Federal Bureau of Investigation,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, There's A Place For You In Today's F.B.I.: Special Agent
Qualifications (1994) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (explaining
that FBI special agent candidates must have uncorrected vision not worse than
20/200) with Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Dep't of the Treasury, Spe-
cial Agent Recruitment Information 3 (1996) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review) (stating that ATF special agent candidates must have distant vision
without correction of at least 20/100 (Snellen) in each eye, correctable to 20/30
(Snellen) in one eye and 20/20 (Snellen) in the other).
Of course, no court should tolerate the efforts of a plaintiff to rely on purely
frivolous allegations in an attempt to qualify as having a covered disability. See Tor-
res v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the argument that left-
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standard or policy actually is a valid predictor of who is capable of
performing the essential functions of the job, law enforcement
agencies would be forced to adopt more accurate and appropriate
employment standards.1' Absent being classified as disabled,
applicants with borderline physical impediments would only have
limited recourse for attacking hiring standards alleged to be un-
duly inflated. Specifically, these individuals would be reduced to
arguing that the questioned standard has no rational basis or rela-
tion to the physical requirements actually needed to serve as a law
enforcement officer. Predictably, few plaintiffs would receive any
relief as almost all hiring standards could withstand a rational basis
attack, even those standards which are unduly high or restrictive."'
Future litigation will reveal whether the majority of courts will
continue to narrowly define who qualifies as having a covered dis-
ability in disputes involving the law enforcement community. In
the meantime, courts appear reluctant to accept claims that a
physical or mental condition substantially limits the major life ac-
tivity of working, especially when the individual is primarily only
precluded from seeking employment as a law enforcement officer.
While the ADA and Rehabilitation Act potentially offer broad
prohibitions against law enforcement agencies engaging in disabil-
ity discrimination, such measures are of little consequence if courts
too narrowly interpret who qualifies as having a covered disability.
IV. UNDERSTANDING "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED," "ESSENTIAL
FUNCTIONS," AND "REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION" IN
RELATION To LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT
A. The "Otherwise Qualified" Requirement
Once it is determined that a law enforcement officer or appli-
cant is disabled under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act,
the next key question is whether the individual is otherwise quali-
handedness qualifies as a covered disability).
107. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (explaining how all employment
standards having a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities must be job-
related and based on business necessity).
108. See, e.g., Padilla v. City of Topeka, 708 P.2d 543, 549 (Kan. 1985) (a police
department's standard that uncorrected visual acuity be no worse than 20/50 passes
the rational basis test); cf. Gregory W. Good & Arol R. Augsburger, Uncorrected
Visual Acuity Standards for Police Applicants, J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN., Mar. 1987,
at 18 (supporting the use of uncorrected visual acuity standards).
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flied for the position at issue.1 9 Federal law recognizes that regard-
less of the fact an individual is disabled, he or she still might be
qualified to serve as a police officer or federal agent, with or with-
out some form of reasonable accommodation. In essence, the is-
sue of whether an individual is otherwise qualified often deter-
mines if illegal discrimination has occurred or is about to occur.
Because of the consequences accompanying a finding that an in-
dividual is otherwise qualified, it is crucial to understand just what
it means to be otherwise qualified.
Southeastern Community College v. Davis11 is one of the most
commonly cited cases dealing with the issue of whether a disabled
individual is otherwise qualified."' In Southeastern Community
College the United States Supreme Court explained, "An other-
wise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's
requirements in spite of his [or her] handicap."112 The Court also
109. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987) (stating
that "the definition of 'handicapped individual' is broad, but only those individuals
who are both handicapped and otherwise qualified are eligible for relief [under the
Rehabilitation Act]"); Lisa J. Stansky, Opening Doors: Five Years After Its Passage,
the Americans With Disabilities Act Has Not Fulfilled the Greatest Fears of its Crit-
ics-or the Greatest Hopes of Its Supporters, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 66, 67 (The
author quotes Stamford, Connecticut, attorney Carla Walworth describing the catch-
22 situation facing employees and applicants: "You have to fit within this window
where you're seriously enough affected so you're disabled but not so seriously so you
can't work.").
It should be pointed out that the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination
against an "otherwise qualified individual with a disability," Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994), while the ADA prohibits discrimination against a"qualified individual with a disability." Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). The implementing regulations for the Rehabilitation Act,
however, commonly use some form of the term "qualified" person. See, e.g., 28
C.F.R. § 41.51 (1996) (containing Department of Justice regulations); 31 C.F.R. §
17.140 (1996) (containing Department of Treasury regulations); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4
(1996) (containing Department of Health and Human Services regulations).
110. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
111. See id.
112. Id. at 406. Although this case focused on participation in a federally funded
program, its holding is analogous to employment cases. Implementing regulations
for the Rehabilitation Act also define the term "qualified handicapped person" as
meaning "[w]ith respect to employment, a handicapped person who, with reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question." 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(k); see also 28 C.F.R. § 41.32(a) (using the same definition of qualified
handicapped person as 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)).
The implementing regulations for Title I of the ADA offer a similar, but
somewhat more thorough definition:
Qualified individual with a disability means an individual with a disability
who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-
related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or
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took note of the fact "that legitimate physical qualifications may
be essential to participation in particular programs."' 3 In light of
the position of the Supreme Court, a plaintiff is precluded from ar-
guing that he or she is otherwise qualified but for a disability.1
4
In subsequent cases focusing on alleged disability discrimina-
tion, the term "otherwise qualified" has been further defined. For
instance, the Supreme Court later declared, "In the employment
context, an otherwise qualified person is one who can perform 'the
essential functions' of the job in question."" 5 Furthermore, the
Court pointed out that it must be determined "whether any
'reasonable accommodation' by the employer would enable the
handicapped person to perform those functions.""' 6 Likewise, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that it is necessary to
desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of such position.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1996).
113. Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 407; see also Simon v. Saint
Louis County, 735 F.2d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 1984) ("A handicapped person may be
required to meet legitimate physical qualifications essential to the job."); cf Tread-
well v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 475 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Once a plaintiff shows an
employer denied him employment because of physical condition, the burden of per-
suasion shifts to the ... employer to show that the criteria used are job related and
that plaintiff could not safely and efficiently perform the essentials of the job.").
114. See Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 407 n.7 (explaining that
"[u]nder such a literal reading [of the term 'otherwise qualified'], a blind person pos-
sessing all the qualifications for driving a bus except sight could be said to be
'otherwise qualified' for the job of driving. Clearly such a result was not intended by
Congress.") (quoting 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A (1978)).
115. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17 (1985) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)); see also Santos
v. Port Auth., No. CIV.94-8427-JSM, 1995 WL 431336, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1995)
("A job function may be considered essential if, inter alia, (1) the reason the position
exists is to perform the function; (2) there are a limited number of employees avail-
able among whom the performance of the job function can be distributed; or (3) the
function is highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his
ability to perform the particular function." (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n)(2))); Ser-
rapica v. City of New York, 708 F. Supp. 64,73 (S.D.N.Y.) ("An employer is allowed
to consider potential safety risks to applicants, co-workers, and others in making a
decision about employment criteria."), affd, 888 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1989). See gen-
erally Gary E. Phelan, Essential Functions of a Job Under The ADA: Determining If a
Disabled Individual Is "Qualified", 39 FED. B. NEWS & J., Jan. 1992, at 46
(examining the meaning of the term "essential functions").
116. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287. When making this determination an employer is free
to consider the fact that "an individual is not otherwise qualified if he poses a signifi-
cant risk to the health or safety of others by virtue of the disability that cannot be
eliminated by reasonable accommodation." Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys., 50
F.3d 1261, 1265 (4th Cir. 1995) (a neurosurgery resident with HIV posed a significant
risk to patients that could not be eliminated with reasonable accommodation; there-
fore, he was not otherwise qualified) (citing 29 U.S.C.A. 88 706(8)(D) (West Supp.
1994) & 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111(3), 12113(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1994))).
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answer two questions: (1) "whether ... [the disabled individual]
could 'perform the essential functions of the job, i.e., functions that
bear more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue,' and (2)
if not, whether 'any reasonable accommodation by the employer
would enable [the disabled individual] to perform those func-
tions."'
117
Moreover, "an individualized inquiry" is required in order to
determine whether a person is otherwise qualified for the position
in question."' When conducting an individualized inquiry, consid-
eration should be given to the following factors: (1) the nature of
the risk posed by the disability; (2) the duration of the risk; (3) the
severity of the risk; and (4) the probability of the risk or injury ac-
tually occurring."9 Because an individualized inquiry is required,
"blanket exclusions" automatically barring the employment or re-
tention of individuals with certain physical or mental conditions
are frequently subject to attack.'O
117. Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385,1393-94 (5th Cir. 1993)).
118. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287. See also William U. McCormack, Grooming and
Weight Standards for Law Enforcement, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., July 1994, at
27, 30 (explaining the physical requirements needed to be a law enforcement offi-
cer). See generally Chris Graves, Officer Down, STAR-TRIB., Mar. 19, 1997, at Al
(reporting that a Desert Storm veteran with a prosthetic leg graduated from the Ari-
zona police academy and now serves as an active member of the police department in
Mesa, Arizona).
119. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. See generally Chiari v. City of League City, 920
F.2d 311,317 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining that "a significant risk of personal injury can
disqualify a handicapped individual from a job if the employer cannot eliminate the
risk ... [and] under section 504, an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a
genuine substantial risk that he or she could be injured or could injure others");
Hogarth v. Thornburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("In order to
evaluate the qualification of a handicapped individual under the [Rehabilitation]
Act, it is ... necessary to analyze two factors: the consequences of a failure to per-
form and the likelihood of such a failure being caused by the handicapping condi-
tion.").
120. See, e.g., Stillwell v. Kansas City, Mo. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 872 F. Supp.
682, 687 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (declaring that a "blanket exclusion of all one-handed li-
cense applicants [who are seeking authority to carry firearms as security guards,] be-
cause of an unfounded fear that they are dangerous and more likely to use deadly
force clearly runs afoul of the individualized assessment required by the ADA");
Bombrys v. City of Toledo, 849 F. Supp. 1210, 1219-21 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (holding
"the City of Toledo's blanket disqualification of individuals with insulin-dependent
diabetes as candidates for police officer violates the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ...
[and] the Americans with Disabilities Act," while also speculating that Davis v.
Meese might no longer be good law); Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (considering the unique nature of employment as a FBI agent, the court held
that "the preclusion of insulin-dependent diabetics from employment as special
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Clearly, all law enforcement agencies should be very cautious
before dismissing any applicant or employee with a disability. To
be exact, a law enforcement agency should not even consider dis-missing or removing an individual from consideration until after
having seriously considered whether reasonable accommodation
would be possible and determining whether the individual's dis-
ability actually would pose a "direct threat" or interfere with per-
formance of the essential functions of the position. Prior to con-
ducting this sort of individualized assessment, any adverse
employment decision would be premature and in violation of fed-
eral law.
B. The "Essential Functions" of Police Officers, Sheriffs' Deputies,
and Federal Agents
When determining whether someone is otherwise qualified to
serve as a law enforcement officer, the employing agency must
evaluate the person's abilities, or lack thereof, compared to the es-
agents and investigative specialists does not violate the Rehabilitation Act"); Duran
v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 954, 955-56 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (after declaring that the
defendant City of Tampa had violated the Rehabilitation Act, the court ordered the
defendant not to consider a police officer applicant's history of epilepsy as a disquali-
fying medical condition); Lee v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 4 Mass. 83
(Super. Ct. 1995) (determining that a police department's policy violated state law
because it prohibited any police officer who suffered a heart attack from returning to
full duty); David Owens, Vision Standard for Troopers Sparks Lawsuit, THE
HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 3, 1995, at A3 (reporting that a police officer, who was
seeking employment with the Connecticut State Police, filed suit claiming that the
use of "a 'blanket prohibition' concerning vision requirements" violated the ADA).
121. According to the implementing regulations for Title I of the ADA:
Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or
safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by
reasonable accommodation. The determination that an individual poses a
"direct threat" shall be based on an individualized assessment of the indi-
vidual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.
This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies
on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objec-
tive evidence. In determining whether an individual would pose a direct
threat, the factors to be considered include:
(1) The duration of the risk;
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and
(4) The imminence of the potential harm.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); see EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276,
1283 (7th Cir. 1995) ("It would seem that a requirement that employees not pose a
significant safety threat in the workplace would obviously be consistent with business
necessity."); James G. Frierson, An Analysis of ADA Provisions on Denying Em-
ployment Because of a Risk of Future Injury, 17 EMPLoYEE REL. L.J. 603 (1992)
(discussing risk of future injury in regards to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act).
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sential functions he or she will be called upon to perform. In order
to make this comparison, therefore, it is vital to identify what truly
are the essential functions of a police officer, sheriff's deputy, or
federal agent.'2 According to the ADA, "consideration shall be
given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are
essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this de-
scription shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of
the job."1'2 As a result, it would be both logical and prudent for
law enforcement agencies to take a proactive approach towards
expressly defining the duties and responsibilities of its personnel,
before a dispute ever arises.
Several courts have tackled the issue of trying to define the es-
sential functions of a police officer. For example, one such court
has explained,
122. See generally Martin Schiff, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Whither the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification and Law Enforcement Exemp-
tions, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 13, 16 (1993) ("[T]here is not even a legal consensus as
to what constitutes the precise tasks that a police officer must perform.... ."); Flynn
McRoberts, Park Ridge Police May Fire Partly Deaf Officer, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1993,
at NW1 (quoting Georgetown University Law Professor Chai Feldblum: "Law en-
forcement will be an important testing ground under the ADA because they have
such strict standards that may not be reflective of the actual requirements of the
job.").
In March 1993, representatives from the Major City Chiefs Association, the
National Executive Institute Associates, and the FBI identified what they believed to
be the essential functions of the position of police officer:
1. Make Custodial Arrests;.
2. Drive, Operate, and Maintain Departmental Vehicles;
3. Provide Care and Treatment to Citizens and Prisoners;
4. Communicate Orally or in Writing;
5. Conduct Investigations;
6. Use Force;
7. Perform Patrol Functions;
8. Perform Rescue Operations and Render Citizen Assistance;
9. Conduct Searches and Seizures;
10. Perform Public Safety Operations.
See MAJOR CITY CHIEFS ASSOCIATION ET AL., REPORT ON PHYSICAL FITNESS
TESTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT 7 (1993) [hereinafter REPORT ON PHYSICAL FITNESS TESTING].
123. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). But cf.
Sharp v. Abate, 887 F. Supp. 695, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[D]etermining 'whether
physical qualifications are essential functions of a job requires the court to engage in
a highly fact-specific inquiry.... Such a determination should be based upon more
than statements in a job description . . . .' (quoting Hall v. United States Postal
Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1988))).
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Police officers must be able to take action to uphold their
sworn duty to preserve the peace, protect life and prop-
erty, and prevent crime. The infrequency with which a
particular officer fires a gun or makes an arrest in further-
ance of her duty does not eliminate the need to be capa-
ble of performing that duty. Thus,... the ability to fire a
weapon and to make a forceful arrest is an essential job
function.124
There is little question that many courts believe an officer must
possess the ability to make a forceful arrest, as well as the capabil-
ity to effectively use a firearm.'2 Because of the need for both
firearm proficiency and safety, even the ability to shoot in the
Weaver stance (a two-handed shooting position) has been held to
be "an essential function for police officers" in one stateY.16 Be-
sides being able to make arrests and use a firearm, one court has
noted that the abilities to "patrol by foot or automobile; appre-
hend violators; direct traffic; operate tractors, towing equipment,
and emergency equipment; enforce traffic regulations; and main-
tain records . . . clearly strike at the heart of a police officer's
job."1 27 Just as important as any of the essential functions already
mentioned, police officers also should be both honest and law
abiding.1'
124. Coski v. City of Denver, 795 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); see also
Blissitt v. City of Chicago, No. CIV.86-9584, 1990 WL 71315, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 1,
1990) ("The core duties of a sworn officer on the Chicago Police Department are to
preserve order, peace, and quiet and enforce the laws and ordinances throughout the
City.... For that reason police officers are trained in defense tactics, effecting ar-
rests, and using deadly force and are authorized to carry weapons.").
125. See, e.g., Fussell v. Georgia Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1572 (S.D. Ga.
1995) (concluding "that being able to shoot straight is a bona fide essential function
of... employment as a port authority police officer"); Dawn V. Martin, The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act-Introductory Comments, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 11 n.53
(1993-94) (stating that an "ability to affect forceful arrests is a national standard for
police officers").
126. Ethridge v. State, 860 F. Supp. 808, 819 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
127. Santos v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. CIV.94-8427, 1995 WL 431336, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1995).
128. See generally Hartman v. City of Petaluma, 841 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding that refusing to hire an officer due to his lack of honesty did not violate the
ADA or public policy); Vance McLaughlin & Robert L. Bing, III, Law Enforcement
Personnel Selection: A Commentary, 15 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 271, 271 (1987)
("Individuals becoming police officers must have high ethical standards . . .);
Daniel J. Schofield, Employment Information Release Agreements, FBI L. EN-
FORCEMENT BULL., Dec. 1996, at 19, 19 ("Law enforcement organizations need to
hire employees who possess the highest degree of integrity, character, and profes-
Ap.Jri 1997] 1007
1008 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW
Compared to police officers, sheriffs' deputies are much more
likely to work for a department that is responsible for maintaining
a jail.129 Additionally, sheriffs' deputies are more likely to provide
law-enforcement-related services to the courts such as providing
security and serving civil summonses.3 In most cases, however, a
sheriffs department fulfills or supplements the functions of a tra-
ditional police department. 3 ' For instance, approximately 88% of
all sheriffs' departments provide routine patrol services in their
jurisdiction, while an estimated 77% also enforce traffic laws.
32
Furthermore, it is not atypical for sheriffs' departments to have
primary responsibility in their jurisdictions for investigating violent
crimes, 90%; offenses against property, 92%; arson, 88%; and drug
related crimes, 78%. 33 For these reasons, the essential functions of
a police officer and sheriff's deputy will be relatively comparable.
Some disagreement has arisen over the issue of whether all
police officer or deputy sheriff positions within a department con-
sist of the same essential functions. This issue commonly occurs
when an officer or deputy is not fully capable of performing the
more rigorous duties associated with patrol duty, while he or she is
capable of performing the less physically demanding duties of ei-
ther clerical, administrative, or supervisory work. Nationwide
63% of uniformed local police officers and 39% of sheriffs' de-
partment sworn personnel regularly handle calls for service.3 4 Evi-
sional competence."); cf. Taub v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining
that because postal employees must be "'honest, reliable, [and] trustworthy,"' crimi-
nal conduct is inconsistent with these requirements) (citation omitted)).
129. See REAVES, SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS, supra note 4, at 12-13. In 1993 jails
were operated by 79% of the reporting sheriffs' offices. See id. at 13. On the other
hand, only 5% of local police departments operated a jail in 1993. See REAVES,
LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, supra note 4, at 12. It should be noted that 6% of the
sheriffs' departments operated a lockup or temporary holding facility, whereas 26%
of local police departments performed this function. See id.; REAVES, SHERIFFS'
DEPARTMENTS, supra note 4, at 13.
130. See REAVES, SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS, supra note 4, at 12-13. In particular,
93% and 97% of all sheriffs' departments provided court security and served civil
summons, respectively. See idt In 1993 approximately 20% and 7% of police de-
partments provided court security and served civil process, respectively. See
REAVES, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, supra note 4, at 12.
131. See REAVES, SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS, supra note 4, at iv, 10-14.
132. See id. at 11, 12.
133. See id. at 10, 11.
134. See id. at iv. But see REAVES, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, supra note 4, at
3 (stating that 67% of all local police officers were uniformed personnel regularly
assigned to respond to calls for service). Although not necessarily assigned to patrol
duty, approximately 90% of all police officers assigned to departments with 100 or
more sworn personnel were assigned to field operations in 1993 (e.g., responding to
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dently, a significant percentage of police officers and sheriffs'
deputies are not assigned to traditional patrol duty. Nevertheless,
some courts have taken the position that all sworn personnel must
be equally capable of serving in any position within a police or
sheriff's department, '35 while other courts have been reluctant to
adopt this position.'36
The essential functions of a federal agent generally are con-
sidered to be somewhat more expansive than the essential func-
tions of the average police officer or sheriff's deputy. At the same
time, both the ability to make a forceful arrest and use a firearm,
as well the expectation of honesty, are going to apply equally to
the position of a federal agent. Compared to most police officers
or sheriffs' deputies, federal agents typically have a higher prob-
ability of dealing with the most sensitive forms of information (for
calls for service, conducting investigations, performing special operations, and fulfill-
ing traffic-related duties). See id.
135. See Simon v. Saint Louis County, 735 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirming dis-
trict court's judgment that the ability to make forceful arrests and transfer among all
positions was necessary to the job of a police officer); Champ v. Baltimore County,
884 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D. Md. 1995) (giving deference to the employer's position, the
court recognized that "the ability to make a forcible arrest, drive a vehicle under
emergency conditions and qualify with a weapon are essential functions that all Bal-
timore County police officers must be able to perform"), affd, 91 F.3d 129 (4th Cir.
1996).
136. See, e.g., Vazquez v. Bedsole, 888 F. Supp. 727,731 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (denying
a defense motion for summary judgment after considering a disabled deputy sheriff's
argument that she was qualified for various deputy sheriff positions that did not re-
quire her to carry a weapon, apprehend fugitives, or drive a vehicle); Dorris v. City
of Kentwood, No. CIV.1:94-249, 1994 WL 762219, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 4, 1994)
(denying a motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of fact existed as
to what were the essential functions of a police officer teaching Drug Abuse Resis-
tance Education (D.A.R.E)); Kuntz v. City of New Haven, No. CIV.N-90-480-JGM,
1993 WL 276945, at *12 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 1993) (finding that the essential functions
of a police lieutenant are "overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, supervisory in na-
ture"), aff'd, 29 F.3d 622 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 667 (1994). See generally
Sally Gross-Farina, Fit for Duty? Cops, Choirpractice, and Another Chance for
Healing, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1079, 1129 (1993) (stating that "all but the very small-
est police departments have senior officers who have not seen the inside of a patrol
car for years"); Jaret Seiberg, Failure to Promote Officer Violates Discrimination
Acts, CONN. L. TRIB., July 18, 1994, at 5 (describing controversy over the essential
functions of a police lieutenant and the New Haven Police Department's unwilling-
ness to promote a disabled police sergeant); Disability Discrimination--Definition of
Disability, MICH. LAW WKLY, July 17, 1995, at 9 (discussing how a D.A.R.E. officer
was fired because he could not perform the duties of patrol officer); Handicapped
Discrimination-Essential Job Qualifications, MICH. LAW WKLY, Oct. 24, 1994, at 5
(explaining that a summary judgment motion was denied due to a dispute over es-
sential functions of position officer was actually performing).
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example, information vital to national defense and security).137 As
a result, federal agents are almost expected to be above reproach.
Because of such an expectation, federal agents also need to be
highly stable individuals who are capable of adhering to the high-
est standards of personal and professional conduct. 13 Moreover,
all federal agents and special agent candidates must have a
"personal and professional history [which] affirmatively indicates
loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness,
honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment, as well as
freedom from conflicting allegiances and potential for coercion." '139
The cumulative presence of these qualities is directly related to
eligibility for access to classified information,"4° which is a prereq-
uisite for service as a federal agent. 4'
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania has provided one of the most thorough, if not the
most thorough, judicial written accounts of the hiring process and
employment criteria used by the FBI.142 Most mportantly, the
court summarized the unique duties of an FBI special agent:
The special agent is the principal investigative official of
the FBI. The work of the special agent involves investi-
gating violations of federal criminal law, including react-
ing to crimes, making arrests, collecting evidence of
crimes, conducting surveillances, serving warrants, sub-
137. See RONALD KESSLER, THE FBI 92 (1993) (explaining that the FBI has ap-
proximately 20% of its agents-some 2600-assigned to foreign counterintelligence).
138. See Hogarth v. Thornburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (1993) ("In determining
the qualification of an applicant for [a top secret security] clearance, the FBI consid-
ers such characteristics as reliability, dependability, and stability.").
139. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245 (1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. §
435 app. at 412-18 (1995) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 12,968].
140. See id. Eligibility for access to classified information is synonymous with
holding a security clearance.
141. See generally Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513, 514 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1995) (indicating
that employment of federal agents is conditioned on security clearances), cert. denied
sub nom. Mata v. FBI, 116 S. Ct. 1877 (1996); McDaniel v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 896 F.
Supp. 1482, 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (explaining that "legislative history strongly indi-
cates that Congress intended retention of a government security clearance to qualify
as an essential job function under the ADA" (referring to H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at
57 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 339)); Hogarth, 833 F. Supp. at 1082
(explaining that "a top secret security clearance.... is required for all FBI employ-
ees because of their actual or potential access to classified information"); Buttino v.
FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 300 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that every FBI employee
must have a top-secret security clearance).
142. See Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d
Cir. 1989).
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poenas and investigative demands, and testifying in fed-
eral judicial proceedings. Special agents also have pri-
mary responsibility for conducting counterintelligence
activities within the United States and its territories....
Many of the tasks required of the special agent involve
periods of strenuous physical exertion and physical and
mental stress.... Special agents may be called upon, ei-
ther singlehandedly, or in the company of others, to ap-
prehend suspects, many of whom are armed and danger-
ous and have records of violent criminal activity.1 43
The court also added:
Frequently,... a special agent may be given an assign-
ment in a "reactive situation," where preplanning is not
possible either as to the probable length of time of the
assignment or as to the physical requirements and poten-
tial hazards of the assignment. . . . Special agents are
trained and required to be able to perform all tasks of the
job at all times. . . . Assignments do include occasions
when regular meals are substantially delayed or omit-
ted.'44
Although the primary duties and responsibilities of an FBI agent
vary somewhat from those of other federal law enforcement
agents, the essential functions of an FBI agent are relatively com-
parable to the essential functions of agents employed by the DEA,
the Department of Treasury, or any other federal law enforcement
agency. 14s
Only after considering the essential functions of the law en-
forcement position in dispute can a valid determination be made
as to whether an individual with a disability is otherwise qualified
for the position. While it is true that the essential functions of a
143. Id. at 510; see also Butler v. Thornburgh, 900 F2d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that a special agent is "required to conduct surveillances, undertake in-
vestigations, testify in federal court, make arrests, collect evidence, conduct counter-
intelligence activities, carry and use a firearm, use physical force and drive an auto-
mobile"). See generally FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FACE UNIQUE CHALLENGES WITH THE FBI, 9 (1994) ("Service with the FBI
is not a 'nine-to-five' career.").
144. Davis, 692 F. Supp. at 512.
145. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Reno, No. CIV.95-2058, 1996 WL 281933, at *5 n.6 (4th
Cir. May 29, 1996) (describing the essential functions of a deputy U. S. marshal);
Koger v. Reno, 98 F. 3d 631, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing the duties of a dep-
uty U.S. marshal); Salmon Pifieiro v. Lehman, 653 F. Supp. 483, 486 (D.P.R. 1987)
(describing the duties of an investigator with the Naval Investigative Service).
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position can vary from agency to agency, department to depart-
ment, and city to city, it is reasonable to predict that many trial
courts will be deferential to those courts that already have con-
fronted this issue.' 46
C. Who Is Not "Otherwise Qualified"
Frequently the most basic issue in cases involving a disabled
law enforcement officer or applicant is whether he or she is oth-
erwise qualified for the position. It is appropriate to conclude that
a person is not qualified only after considering the essential func-
tions of the position, making an individualized assessment, and
considering whether reasonable accommodation is possible. While
reviewing the employment decisions of law enforcement agencies
for possible violations of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, several
courts have confronted the issue of whether a disabled individual
was otherwise qualified to serve as a law enforcement officer.
A court commonly will hold that an individual is not otherwise
qualified if the court believes the person would pose a danger to
him or herself, other officers, or the community. For example, one
court noted, "A municipality must protect its citizens from persons
'suffering from bi-polar depression, alcoholism, and post-traumatic
stress syndrome'; it does not send them out to protect other citi-
zens."'147 Likewise, concern for public safety motivated the United
States Marshals Service to terminate a deputy marshal who suf-
fered from a delusional paranoid personality disorder.14' Another
146. See Elizabeth Burbeck & Adrian Furnham, Police Officer Selection: A Criti-
cal Review of the Literature, 13 J. POLIcE SQ. & ADMIN. 58, 63 (1985) ("In a country
the size of the United States, with a plethora of police forces ranging from rural
sheriffs' offices of one or two men to huge urban forces like New York and Los An-
geles, law enforcers in different forces can hardly be said to be doing the same job..
. ."); McLaughlin & Bing, supra note 128, at 272 ("Every jurisdiction employing law
enforcement officers has different tasks, rules, and client needs.").
147. Graehling v. Village of Lombard, 58 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1995). Regard-
less of whether the officer's alleged forced-resignation occurred before or after the
ADA was effective, the court still felt that "he had no business wearing a police uni-
form." Id. "An officer who has beaten a prisoner, destroyed gas stations during
walking blackouts, and believes himself mentally incompetent to make important
decisions is not a fit police officer." Id.
148. See Lassiter, 1996 WL 281933, at *1. Before his termination, the plaintiff had
served as a deputy marshal for 22 years. See id. In 1990 the plaintiff began to be-
lieve that his neighbors conspired to burglarize his home. See id. He eventually im-
plemented a plan whereby he hid in his home, armed himself with automatic weap-
ons, and refused to flush his toilets out of fear of alerting the conspirators to his
presence. See id. Ultimately, he was removed from his home after neighbors alleged
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court held that "a police officer who cannot fire a weapon or make
a forceful arrest is a danger to herself, other officers, and the pub-
lie."
149
While public safety is more than a legitimate concern, it needs
to be stressed that the disabled individual must pose a significant
risk of substantial harm before he or she is deemed not otherwise
qualified. 5 ' According to the Judiciary Committee of the United
States House of Representatives, "A plaintiff is not required to
prove that he or she poses no risk."" This same congressional
that he was threatening to kill people. See id. at *2. Because of the plaintiff's condi-
tion, a doctor recommended that the deputy no longer be permitted to carry a fire-
arm. See id.
149. Coski v. City of Denver, 795 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). In an-
other case a court determined that a police officer with a congenital total hearing
loss in one ear was not a qualified individual. See Karbusicky v. City of Park Ridge,
950 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
150. See supra notes 116, 119, 121; see also Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Employers'
Screening Procedures Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: What's Legal?
What's Illegal? What's Debatable?, WL C780 ALI-ABA 291, 318 (1993) (explaining
that before rejecting an individual as a "direct threat," an employer "must be pre-
pared to show a significant current risk of substantial harm (not a speculative or re-
mote risk)"); Jeffrey Higginbotham, The Americans with Disabilities Act, FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Aug. 1991, at 25, 30 (stating that "generalized fears, remote
possibilities, or only slightly enhanced threats to safety or health are insufficient rea-
sons for denying employment"); Frank C. Morris, Jr., Americans with Disabilities
Act: Medical Examinations and Inquiries, WL Q217 ALI-ABA 283, 291 (1992)
(explaining that an employer may exclude an individual with a disability if the indi-
vidual poses "a significant, current risk of substantial harm to health or safety"); El-
len M. Saideman, The ADA As a Tool for Advocacy: A Strategy for Fighting Em-
ployment Discrimination Against People with Disabilities, 8 J. L. & HEALTH 47, 64-69
(1993-94) (discussing the issues of threat to self and threat to others); Mary Anne
Sedey, The Threat to Safety Defense Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 39
FED. B. NEWS & J. 96, 97 (1992) ("Employment can be denied on the basis of possi-
ble future injury only where there is a showing of a reasonable probability of sub-
stantial harm."); Robert John Maselek, Jr., Note, Employee Medical Screening Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 653, 684-85
(1992) (addressing safety concerns and direct threat).
Despite the weight of authority to the contrary, the DEA apparently relies
upon a significantly more exclusionary standard when asking its contract physicians
to medically clear applicants for the DEA training program. The current post-
medical examination, medical certification form provided to DEA contract physi-
cians states the following: "If there are any abnormalities... or other medical con-
ditions that would pose an unusual risk to the individual or others in performing such
training, please note these findings... so that training can be rescheduled when the
medical condition resolves or stabilizes." Letter from Carolyn Cerini, Chief of
Health Services Unit, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
DEA Medical Providers (a copy of this letter was supplied on Nov. 18, 1996, in re-
sponse to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request made by Robert S. Mor-
gan) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
151. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 46 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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committee also explained, "As stated in Chalk v. United States
District Court, '[little in science can be proved with complete cer-
tainty, and section 504 does not require such a test. As authorita-
tively construed by the Supreme Court, section 504 allows the ex-
clusion of an employee only if there is a significant risk . . .to
others.' 1 2 At the very least, a legitimate probability of the risk
materializing must be found to exist prior to declaring an officer or
applicant not otherwise qualified.'53
Partially based on public safety concerns, numerous courts
have held that particular individuals suffering from alcoholism are
not otherwise qualified to serve as law enforcement officers. 14 It is
445,469.
152. Id. at 46 (quoting Chalk v. United States District Court, 840 F.2d 701, 707
(9th Cir. 1988) (citing School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16
(1987))). The Judiciary Committee also declared, "The decision to exclude cannot
be based on merely 'an elevated risk of injury."' Id. (quoting Mantolete v. Bolger,
767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985)).
153. See supra notes 121 and 150. One court has relied upon a significantly lower
standard. See Mahoney v. Ortiz, 645 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). When upholding
the New York Police Department's policy of automatically disqualifying any appli-
cant who had ever suffered two or more dislocations of the same shoulder, the court
stated, "since there is a chance of a new dislocation, and its consequences could be
unacceptably costly, the regulation is reasonable in excluding the apparently few
who statistically have this risk from such employment." Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
Expert testimony indicated that the plaintiff had a 10% to 15% chance of dislocating
his shoulder again. See id.
154. See, e.g., Labrucherie v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. CIV.94-1533-SC, 1995
WL 523905, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1995) (holding that an alcoholic officer, who
was sentenced to 120 days in jail following his third DUI arrest, was not fired be-
cause of his disability but because of his criminal conduct and his inability to report
for work while incarcerated); Rodgers v. County of Yolo-Sheriff's Dep't, 889 F.
Supp. 1284, 1291 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining that an animal control employee of a
sheriff's department was not protected under the Rehabilitation Act because her
consumption of alcohol impaired her ability to safely carry a weapon and drive a
vehicle); Huff v. Israel, 573 F. Supp. 107, 110 (M.D. Ga. 1983) (accepting defendant's
argument that "plaintiff would be unable to function effectively in his position as
Compliance Officer ... when he, himself, could not comply with the law, as evi-
denced by his three convictions for DUI"), vacated, 732 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1984).
But cf. Dimonda v. New York City Police Dep't, No. CIV.94-0840-JGK, 1996 WL
194325 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1996) (denying defendant's summary judgment motion
because there were unresolved factual issues regarding whether a demoted alcoholic
detective, who got drunk during surveillance at a bar and discharged his firearm into
a police station wall, was otherwise qualified to remain a detective).
At the time the ADA was adopted, Congress included specific provisions
pertaining to alcoholics and illegal drug users:
[T]he term "qualified individual with a disability" shall not include any
employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs,
when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use .... [and the em-
ployer] may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or
who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or
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very important to note, however, that no court has based its ruling
simply on an individual's status of being an alcoholic. Instead,
each court has focused on the fact that the respective individual
was engaging in illegal, irresponsible, or unsafe behavior. For in-
stance, Butler v. ThornburghP5 5 involved the termination of an al-
coholic FBI agent after he had engaged in several separate acts of
misconduct while intoxicated: picking a fight with "a crippled gas
station attendant"; provoking a fight and physically injuring a se-
curity guard; driving an FBI vehicle into a wall; and forgetting
where he left his Bureau vehicle.'56 Without much surprise, the
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
agent had shown himself to be incapable of safely performing his
duties.' 7 In Little v. Federal Bureau of Investigation'58 a district
court reviewed the termination of an FBI special agent who had
been involved in five separate alcohol-related incidents, including
one occasion where he had been drunk on duty.59 While acknowl-
edging that an intoxicated special agent would not be otherwise
qualified to fulfill his duties, the court added, "[I]t is clear that an
employer subject to the Rehabilitation Act must be permitted to
terminate its employee on account of egregious misconduct, irre-
spective of whether the employee is handicapped."'60
In a third case an alcoholic police officer was terminated after
seven alcohol-related incidents-which included fighting at a bar,
fighting at a hotel, and committing a hit-and-run accident.1 6' Tak-
job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even
if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug use or
alcoholism of such employee....
42 U.S.C. § 12114(a), (c)(4) (1994); cf. statutes cited supra note 53 (stating that users
of illegal drugs and some alcoholics are not even considered to be disabled under the
Rehabilitation Act).
155. 900 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1990).
156. Id. at 872.
157. See id. at 876. At the district court level, the trial judge wrote, "The
[Rehabilitation] Act does not create a duty to accommodate an alcoholic [FBI spe-
cial agent] who is not 'otherwise qualified,' i.e. commits an act which standing alone
disqualifies him from service and is not entirely a manifestation of alcohol abuse."
Butler v. Meese, No. CIV.88-2924, 1989 WL 38723, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 19, 1989),
aff'd sub nom. Butler v. Thornburgh, 900 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1990), and cert. denied,
498 U.S. 998 (1990).
158. 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993)
159. See id. at 255-56. See generally Eric Harbrook Cottrell, There's Too Much
Confusion Here, and I Can't Get No Relief: Alcoholic Employees and the Federal
Rehabilitation Act in Little v. FBI, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1753 (1994) (analyzing Little).
160. Little, 1 F.3d at 259.
161. See Rollison v. Gwinnett County, 865 F. Supp. 1564, 1568 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
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ing note of the employing police department's position that
"Plaintiff's off-duty conduct reflected poorly upon the Plaintiff as
a citizen and as a police officer, and poorly upon the Gwinnett
County Police Department,"1 62 the court held:
Requiring a police officer to abide by the law, both on
and off-duty, is not discrimination solely on the basis of a
handicap and there is no cause of action, under the Re-
habilitation Act, for the Plaintiff to pursue.... Under the
ADA the employer is allowed to terminate and not ac-
commodate an alcoholic employee, if the employee does
not perform to the same standard as all other employees,
even if the behavior is related to the employee's alcohol-
ism.
16
Accordingly, no violation of federal law occurs when a law en-
forcement agency either terminates or refuses to hire an alcoholic
who engages in illegal or otherwise bad conduct.'6
Similarly, any individual who engages in the illegal use of
drugs is not otherwise qualified to serve as a law enforcement offi-
cer. 65 For example, one court stated, "[A]n undercover narcotics
162. Id. at 1569.
163. Id. at 1571-72.
164. See generally Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 1995)
("Employers subject to the Rehabilitation Act and ADA must be permitted to take
appropriate action with respect to an employee on account of egregious or criminal
conduct, regardless of whether the employee is disabled."); Adamczyk v. Chief, Bal-
timore County Police Dep't, No. CIV.H-96-1103, 1997 WL 37031, at *7 (D. Md. Jan.
29, 1997) ("A police department like the Baltimore County Police Department
(BCPD) must be allowed to legally demote even police officers suffering from alco-
holism who egregiously offend female officers and disregard rules and standards
which Baltimore County has established to regulate the conduct of its police force.");
Wilber v. Brady, 780 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that an ATF special agent
was not terminated because he might have been an alcoholic; instead, he was termi-
nated because he drove the wrong direction down an interstate highway in a gov-
ernment vehicle, he killed a two-year-old girl, and he had a 0.207% blood-alcohol
content at the time); Shields v. Shreveport, 579 So. 2d 961 (La. 1991) (noting that the
Rehabilitation Act does not preclude the termination of two police officers for
drinking in uniform and engaging in misconduct); Antoine v. Deparment of Pub.
Safety & Corrections, 681 So. 2d 1282, 1286 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that the
ADA does not prohibit the termination of a state police sergeant who was found to
have a 0.191% blood-alcohol concentration while on traffic enforcement duty, in uni-
form, and operating a state police vehicle); Lavery v. Departmentt of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles, 523 So. 2d 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
the termination of a Florida highway patrol trooper for alcohol and cocaine abuse,
along with poor performance did not violate the Rehabilitation Act).
165. See statutes cited supra note 154; see, e.g., Baustian v. Louisiana, 910 F. Supp.
274 (E.D. La. 1996) (concluding that a Department of Public Safety and Corrections
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officer, whose stress and depression were so severe that they led
him to the use of drugs, is not otherwise qualified under the
[Rehabilitation] Act." '166 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit also confronted this issue in a case involving a
Philadelphia police officer who both tested positive for illegal drug
use and "had been found to be off his beat in the company of a
fellow officer, who was alleged to be selling drugs."167 After con-
sidering the argument "that the very nature of the job requires that
a police officer not engage in unlawful behavior because it is a po-
lice officer's duty to enforce the laws," '168 the court held as follows:
We conclude that accommodating a drug user within the
ranks of the police department would constitute a
"substantial modification" of the essential functions of the
police department and would cast doubt upon the integ-
rity of the police force. No rehabilitation program can al-
ter the fact that a police officer violates the laws he is
sworn to enforce by the very act of using illegal drugs.
Because a police department is justified in concluding
that it cannot properly accommodate a user of illegal
drugs within its ranks, we conclude that... [plaintiff] is
not otherwise qualified for the position. '
Unlike the antidiscrimination protection afforded to those alcohol-
ics who are both qualified and able to conform to the employer's
standards of conduct, an illegal drug user is entitled to no such pro-
tection because he or she is neither "a handicapped individual,"
nor "otherwise qualified.
1 70
At the same time, it seems more than reasonable to speculate
that a law enforcement agency could refuse to employ a former
drug addict.' 7' Although a rehabilitated drug addict might demon-
employee could not legitimately claim he was a rehabilitated drug addict; rather, he
was a current user as evidenced by his possession of an illegal drug only seven weeks
before his termination and therefore was not a qualified individual with a disability).
166. Desper v. Montgomery County, 727 F. Supp. 959,964 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
167. Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1142 (3d Cir. 1988).
See generally Paul Reidinger, Trends in the Law; Take a Toke, Take a Hike, A.B.A.
J., June 1, 1988, at 96, 98 (reporting on the Copeland decision).
168. Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1149.
169. Id.
170. See Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979), and holding that because a
terminated police officer addicted to heroin does not even qualify as a "handicapped
individual," there is no need to consider whether he is "otherwise qualified").
171. See Brent LaLonde & Robert Ruth, Are Police Rules Substandard?,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 1994, at 1A (describing how "[lI]aw enforcement offi-
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strate that he or she is entitled to the protections of the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act,72 law enforcement agencies seemingly would
have little trouble justifying the exclusion of this sort of individual
from a law enforcement career. Arguably, the very nature of this
type of disability would render the individual incapable of per-
forming the essential functions of a police officer or federal agent.
Specifically, a law enforcement agency could argue that a past rec-
ord of drug addiction should be disqualifying because of any of the
following reasons: the individual's previous record of repeated il-
legal behavior directly conflicts with the very nature of law en-
forcement;'73 various risks and temptations could result from per-
mitting the individual to investigate drug offenses; 174 and the
credibility and impeachment problems that would arise whenever
the individual might testify in a criminal proceeding. 75 In most
cases it seems very unlikely that a court would disagree with the
refusal of a law enforcement agency to employ or accommodate a
rehabilitated drug addict. 76
cials ... fear that federal laws will hinder efforts to keep former drug addicts off po-
lice forces"). See generally Michael R. Smith & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Law Enforce-
ment: The Police and the Americans with Disabilities Act-Who is Being Discrimi-
nated Against?, 29 CRIM. L. BULL. 516, 523-24 (1993) (speculating that concern over
whether law enforcement officials could be forced to hire illegal drug users may
prove unfounded). But see Martin Schiff, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Its
Antecedents, and Its Impact on Law Enforcement Employment, 58 MO. L. REV. 869,
900-01 (1993) (seemingly catering to the initial fears that surfaced within the law en-
forcement community following passage of the ADA).
172. See, e.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (concluding
that persons with histories of drug use are handicapped within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act).
173. See Higginbotham, supra note 150, at 25,27.
174. See Victor E. Kappeler & Danny D. VanHoose, Law Enforcement: Illegal
Drug Use by Narcotics Agents-Retiring the Addicted Centurion, 31 CRIM. L. BULL.
61, 62-66 (1995) (citing Newlun v. Department of Retirement Sys., 770 P.2d 1071
(Wash. Ct. App. 1989), and describing how a cocaine-obsessed, Spokane, Washing-
ton, police officer stole drugs that had been seized as evidence).
175. See David K. Fram, ADA Rules for Drug and Alcohol Abuse, PRAC. LAW.,
Oct. 1993, at 35, 39; see also EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note
13, § 8.7, VIII-5 (speculating that a history of illegal drug use would undermine the
credibility of the officer as a prosecution witness).
176. But see EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 13, § 8.7, VIII-
6 (stating that the automatic exclusion of a person with a history of illegal drug use
might not be justified if the individual had "an extensive period of successful per-
formance as a police officer since the time of the drug use"); id. (explaining possible
reasonable accommodations for an individual with a history of illegal drug use might
include requiring periodic drug tests).
In Johnson v. Smith the Federal Bureau of Prisons rejected a correctional of-
ficer candidate after he disclosed his history of drug and alcohol use. No. CIV.5-84-
131, 1985 WL 4998, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 13, 1985). The applicant revealed that "he
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Courts also have ruled that dishonest individuals may be pre-
cluded from law enforcement employment regardless of disability
status. In Hartman v. City of Petaluma'7 a plaintiff filed suit alleg-
ing that he was not hired as a police officer because he was a re-
habilitated drug addict. 17  Although the court noted that there was
little evidence that plaintiff was ever a drug addict, the court oth-
erwise gave little attention to the issue of whether the plaintiff was
actually disabled.179 Instead, the court concluded that the plaintiff
was not hired for being less than honest during the hiring proc-
ess.80 In particular, the court pointed out how the plaintiff admit-
ted that he had used drugs "plus or minus 100 times" only after a
polygraph test indicated that his original answer of approximately
ten times was false." ' In a somewhat similar case, a dismissed
agent with the Naval Investigative Service had "intentionally mis-
represented his employment application by denying in his pre-
employment physical that he suffered from epilepsy and sei-
zures."'2 Recognizing the fact that the agent could have been
terminated for his dishonesty alone, the court ultimately deter-
mined that "the government is not obligated to provide a reason-
able accommodation by reason of the plaintiff's misrepresenta-
tion.""' Considering the holdings of these two cases, courts appear
less than eager to address a claim of disability discrimination in
cases where the officer or applicant was legitimately rejected on
had used marijuana almost daily from 1969 to 1977 .... speed 50 to 70 times, LSD 10
times, hash 50 to 100 times, downers 5 times, and alcohol frequently." Id. Since
1977, however, he allegedly had been drug free for six years. See id. at *2. In re-
sponse to a defense motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the
defendant failed to show that the applicant was unqualified for the position. See id.
Additionally, the court held that the issue of whether the applicant's disability would
"prevent him from performing the job ... must be resolved at trial." Id.
177. 841 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
178. See id. at 947. Incidentally, the plaintiff was John Hartman, a former mem-
ber of the Doobie Brothers rock band. See Rock Drummer Loses His Bid to Become
a Police Officer, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 12, 1994, at A-6 (describing Hartman's failed
lawsuit); Jim Doyle, Ex-Musician's Bid to Become Cop Is Rejected, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
12, 1994, at A15 (incorrectly stating that plaintiff's "hopes were dashed this week-
not because he had used too many drugs-but because he apparently had not used
enough").
179. See Hartman, 841 F. Supp. at 949.
180. See id. at 950.
181. See id at 950 n.1.
182. Salmon Pifleiro v. Lehman, 653 F. Supp. 483, 492 (D.P.R. 1987); cf. Smith v.
Ortiz, 517 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (recognizing that an alcoholic police officer
could be terminated for lying on his medical history questionnaire).
183. Salmon Pihfeiro, 653 F. Supp. at 492.
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other grounds1 4
Also, any federal law enforcement applicant unable to obtain
a security clearance almost certainly will be classified as not oth-
erwise qualified for employment as a federal agent.8 ' Likewise,
any current federal agent, who is unable to maintain a security
clearance, most likely should anticipate the end of his or her career
as a federal agent." Considering the vital importance of holding a
security clearance, the ability to access classified information and
the underlying eligibility determination arguably are two of the
most significant issues in terms of securing and maintaining federal
law enforcement employment.
Currently, Executive Order No. 12,968 clearly specifies that
"[t]he United States Government does not discriminate on the ba-
sis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual
orientation in granting access to classified information." ' Despite
this executive policy, any individual with a disability who is denied
a security clearance will be in a highly undesirable position, espe-
cially if the person hopes to challenge the resulting determination
that he or she no longer is otherwise qualified for employment as a
federal agent.
In the context of federal law enforcement, a unique predica-
ment has been created in terms of the antidiscrimination mandates
of the Rehabilitation Act, Executive Order No. 12,968, and the re-
quirement that federal agents hold a security clearance. This pre-
dicament results in part from the fact that Executive Order No.
12,968 expressly declined to "create any right to administrative or
184. But cf Kraft v. Police Comm'r, 571 N.E.2d 380 (Mass. 1991) (relying on state
law and holding that a Boston police commissioner could not terminate an officer for
falsely answering two improper questions about his past medical history).
185. See supra note 141; cf McCoy v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 933 F.
Supp. 438, 443-44 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that an alcoholic plaintiff is not a quali-
fied individual with a disability under the ADA because his disability precludes him
from retaining the Department of Energy security clearance required to serve as a
nuclear plant operator); McDaniel v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1482, 1491
(W.D. Mo. 1995) (determining that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual within
the meaning of the ADA because his alcoholism and depression precluded him from
holding the security clearance needed to work for a government contractor produc-
ing components for nuclear weapons).
186. See supra note 141.
187. Exec. Order No. 12,968, supra note 139, at pt. 3, § 3.1(c). Additionally, "[n]o
negative inference concerning the standards in this section [for access to classified
information] may be raised solely on the basis of mental health counseling... [but]
mental health may be considered where it directly relates to those standards." Id. §
3.1(e).
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judicial review" for individuals denied a security clearance.' This
predicament also results from the clearly evident unwillingness of
the federal judiciary to review either the denial or revocation of a
federal security clearance.8 9
Following the United, States Supreme Court case of Depart-
ment of Navy v. Egan,"'0 federal courts consistently have held that
security clearance determinations are not subject to review. 91 In
Egan, the Supreme Court stated, "It should be obvious that no one
has a 'right' to a security clearance."' 92 Additionally, the Court
explained:
The grant of a clearance requires an affirmative act of
discretion on the part of the granting official. The general
standard is that a clearance may be granted only when
'clearly consistent with the interests of the national secu-
rity.'... A clearance does not equate with passing judge-
ment upon an individual's character. Instead, it is only an
attempt to predict his possible future behavior and to as-
sess whether, under compulsion of circumstances or for
188. klI at pt. 7, § 7.2(e). Whenever there is a denial or revocation of a security
clearance, both applicants and employees must have the opportunity to receive a
written explanation, a reasonable opportunity to reply, and an opportunity to
"appeal" the decision to an internal agency panel. See id. at pt. 5, § 5.2(a)(1)-(7).
Comparatively, it probably is more important to note the absence of any enforce-
ment mechanisms to ensure that these opportunities actually occur, as well as any
safeguards to guarantee a good faith, intra-agency, appellate review. See id.
189. See, e.g., Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (holding that the
Merit Systems Protection Board had no authority to review an executive decision to
revoke a security clearance); Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1996)
(agreeing that a district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the merits
of the Navy's decision to revoke the plaintiff's security clearance); Brazil v. United
States Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that a federal
court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a review of the Executive's decision to revoke a
security clearance), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1317 (1996).
190. 484 U.S. 518 (1988). See generally Victor R. Donovan, Administrative and
Judicial Review of Security Clearance Actions: Post Egan, 35 A.F. L. REV. 323 (1991)
(providing an excellent analysis of Egan and other relevant judicial opinions, as well
as predicting how the Supreme Court might react to security clearance challenges
based upon constitutional grounds).
191. See supra note 189. Although the Egan opinion only involved the authority
of the Merit Systems Protection Board to substantively review the underlying deci-
sion to deny or revoke a security clearance, the same reasoning has been extended to
the federal courts. See, e.g., Stehney v. Perry, 101 F. 3d 925, 932 (3d Cir. 1996)
(noting that "federal courts may not 'second guess' the lawful decision of an agency.
.. to terminate a person's access to classified information"); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913
F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the logic of the Egan decision also pre-
cludes judicial review).
192. Egan, 484 U.S. at 528.
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other reasons, he might compromise sensitive informa-
tion.... Predictive judgment of this kind must be made
by those with the necessary expertise in protecting classi-
fied information .... Thus, unless Congress specifically
has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been
reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive
in military and national security affairs.'
Subsequently, the Court refused to authorize a substantive review
of the United States Navy's decision to deny the respondent a se-
curity clearance. 94
Based upon the rationale of the Egan opinion and its ensuing
effect on the federal judiciary, the Rehabilitation Act is potentially
incapable of addressing disability discrimination in the security
clearance process.9 5 For instance, one federal appellate court al-
193. Id. at 528-30 (citations omitted). But cf HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, INVESTIGATING THE INVESTIGATORS: JUSTICE DEP'T BACK-
GROUND REVIEWS BREAK DOWN, H.R. REP. NO. 102-854, at 14-15 (1992) ("An un-
favorable [security clearance] determination may have serious and long-lasting re-
percussions on the employee or applicant ... such a determination can adversely
affect an individual's career,... result in the loss of employment .... Furthermore..
. individuals who have experienced an adverse determination may be stigmatized."
(quoting Procedural Requirements for Personal Security Clearance Appeals Pro-
grams: Characteristics and Rationales for Uniform Minimum Requirements, Memo-
randum by Frederick M. Kaiser, Specialist in American National Government, Gov-
ernment Division, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C., at 5 (Apr. 15,1992)).
Based on current federal law, "no employee in the executive branch of Gov-
ernment may be given access to classified information ... unless.., such access is
determined to be clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United
States." 50 U.S.C. § 435(a)(1) (1995); see also Exec. Order No. 12,968, supra note
139, at pt. 3, § 3.1(b) (explaining the eligibility requirements for access to classified
information). The term national security has been explained as follows:
'National Security' is not a term of art, with a precise, analytic meaning. At
its core the phrase refers to the government's capacity to defend itself from
violent overthrow by domestic subversion or external aggression. But it
also encompasses simply the ability of the government to function effec-
tively so as to serve our interests at home and abroad.
Note, Developments in the Law: The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1133 (1972).
194. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 527-33. The Navy based its decision on the following
information: "respondent's convictions for assault and for being a felon in posses-
sion of a gun .... his failure to disclose ... two earlier convictions for carrying a
loaded firearm[,] ... [and] respondent's own statements that he had had drinking
problems in the past." Id. at 521.
195. See Guillot v. Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320, 1321 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming the dis-
trict court's award of summary judgment on the grounds that the court lacked juris-
diction to decide whether the Navy's denial of a security clearance violated the Re-
habilitation Act); see also Peterson v. Department of Navy, 687 F. Supp. 713, 715
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ready has taken the position that the Rehabilitation Act does not
contain the requisite congressional intent to permit judicial review
of a security clearance decision.'96 Theoretically, such case law po-
tentially provides federal law enforcement agencies with an effec-
tive and powerful means to eliminate any applicant or employee,
even if unjustifiably motivated by the individual's disability
status.Y Aside from political pressure and public scrutiny, there
appears to be no clearly accepted or effective method for challeng-
ing a security clearance denial or revocation-even one premised
upon an arbitrary blanket exclusion, an unjustified stereotype, or
what otherwise would constitute illegal disability discrimination.9 '
(D.N.H. 1988) (determining that "[i]f the statutory constraints imposed by Egan
could be bypassed simply by alleging illegal discrimination, Egan would be viti-
ated").
In another case a deaf plaintiff was denied a security clearance after undergo-
ing psychological testing. See Lovelace v. Stone, 814 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Ky. 1992).
The plaintiff alleged that the tests were discriminatory in violation of the Rehabilita-
tion Act because the testing procedures were "not designed for a person with [a]
hearing impairment[,] ... the examiners did not know sign language, and ... [he]
was not permitted to bring an interpreter." Id at 559. Relying on Egan, the court
concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the security clearance
denial. See id.
196. See Guillot, 970 F.2d at 1325; cf. Becerra, 94 F.3d at 149 (concluding that
"there is no unmistakable expression of purpose by Congress in Title VII to subject
the decision of the Navy to revoke [the plaintiff's] security clearance to judicial scru-
tiny").
197. See Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513, 514 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging "the
concerns of federal agents, whose employment is conditioned on security clearances,
that the lack of judicial review creates the potential for abuse by the agencies and
bureaus employing them").
198. Courts have also rejected security clearance challenges based on alleged due
process constitutional violations. See, e.g., Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 823-24
(D.C. Cir. 1984). Considering the Supreme Court's position in Egan, courts have
been unwilling to embrace most due process arguments. See, e.g., Jones v. Depart-
ment of Navy, 978 F.2d 1223, 1225-26 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Dorfmont, 913 F.2d at 1403-
04. There is a possibility, however, that judicial review could be triggered under an
equal protection challenge. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clear-
ance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Dubbs v. CIA, 866 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir.
1989); Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 312 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that the court
has "the authority and obligation under the United States Constitution to consider
colorable claims under the Equal Protection Clause"). But see, e.g., Hill v. Depart-
ment of Air Force, 844 F.2d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir. 1988) (observing that "if the statu-
tory constraints in Egan can be bypassed simply by invoking alleged constitutional
rights, it makes the authority of Egan hardly worth the effort").
Also, it is unclear whether Congress could even remedy this situation by
amending the Rehabilitation Act so as to specifically provide for substantive judicial
or administrative review. Such congressional action possibly could be challenged as
encroaching upon the authority of the executive branch. See Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592, 614 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Regardless, one federal court judge has
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After reviewing this broad sampling of cases, it should be
rather apparent that there is a significant amount of case law sup-
porting the principle that law enforcement agencies cannot be
compelled to hire or retain individuals who are not otherwise
qualified for law enforcement employment. If anything, the exist-
ing case law should reassure the law enforcement community that
the courts are equally concerned about protecting public safety.
At the same time, most courts have been very deferential to the
hiring and termination decisions of law enforcement employers.
In cases involving federal agencies and security clearance determi-
nations, the federal judiciary has been willing to go so far as to ref-
use to even consider allegations of discrimination. Federal law en-
forcement agencies could hardly ask for any more deference.
D. "Reasonable Accommodation" and When It Is No Longer
Reasonable
Although individuals with disabilities who engage in illegal or
otherwise objectionable behavior deserve virtually no accommo-
dation, it is not possible to conclude so quickly that other disabled
individuals are not entitled to reasonable accommodation. Ac-
cording to the United States Supreme Court, "Employers have an
affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a
handicapped employee."' 9 But regardless of the disability, "an
employer [is not] obligated to fundamentally alter its employment
scheme by rewriting job descriptions.
20
There are numerous examples of courts determining that a
particular accommodation is not reasonable. For example, it is not
reasonable to accommodate an FBI employee's depression and
delusions by preventing his access to classified information, con-
sidering that the handling of such documents is one of his job re-
called for comparable congressional intervention. See United States Info. Agency v.
Krc, 905 F.2d 389,400 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Wald, C.J., concurring).
199. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,289 n.19 (1987); see also
Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the
Rehabilitation Act creates an affirmative obligation to accommodate).
200. Hogarth v. Thornburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also
Fussell v. Georgia Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1573 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (ruling that
the "GPA simply was not required to create a special, 'unarmed police officer' posi-
tion" for an officer whose hand tremors interfered with his ability to use a firearm);
Serrapica v. City of New York, 708 F. Supp. 64,73 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that "[a]n
employer is not obligated to materially rewrite its job description, to lower or to ef-
fect substantial modifications of standards, or to overlook the handicap when the
impairment relates to reasonable criteria for employability in a particular position.").
[Vol. 30:977
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sponsibilities. 1 Another court felt "a waiver of the weapon firing
and forceful arrest requirement is not a reasonable accommoda-
tion" after reviewing evidence that the number of able-bodied of-
ficers would be reduced by allowing those officers unable to per-
form these duties to remain on the force. Furthermore, it is not a
reasonable accommodation for a law enforcement agency to give a
diabetic officer "a second chance" when he fails to control a con-
trollable disability.0 3
In Stewart v. County of Brown 4 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that there are definite limits on an employer's
obligation to provide reasonable accommodation. 5 In Stewart the
court reviewed a deputy's allegations that the local sheriff's de-
partment refused to accommodate his physical disabilities.20' The
deputy, who had been assigned to monitor courthouse security
from a video equipped security room, complained that the
"ergonomics of the security room" caused him to experience
"cervicodorsal spinal symptoms (i.e., neck and back pains) and
headaches., 217 In response, the court considered the accommoda-
tions made by the sheriff's department and the county: they built a
platform in the security room in order to change the angle of the
security monitors; "[t]hey installed mini-blinds on six courthouse
windows and placed film on the doors.., to minimize glare"; they
"purchased an ergonomic chair" for the plaintiff; they lowered the
monitors; and they significantly modified the plaintiff's work
schedule.2
After acknowledging the extensive efforts to ensure reason-
able accommodation, the court explained that the deputy errone-
ously assumed that "'accommodation' means the same thing as 'a
201. See Hogarth, 833 F. Supp. at 1088.
202. Coski v. City of Denver, 795 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
203. See Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 1995)
(involving a diabetic officer who became disoriented while on duty after he failed to
properly monitor his condition). See generally John Barrett, A Survey of Cases Ad-
dressing the Americans with Disabilities Act: Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights,
4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 492 (1992) (summarizing Siefken); The 7th Circuit Limits Pro-
tections of Disability Laws, THE IND. LAW., Oct. 4, 1995, at 23 (discussing Siefken).
204. 86 F.3d 107 (7th Cir. 1996).
205. See id. at 112.
206. See id at 110.
207. Id at 109. Previously, the deputy had been removed from patrol duty after
he had used excessive force during an arrest. See id.
208. See id. at 110.
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perfect cure for the problem."' 2° The court also concluded that it
would be difficult "to imagine how much more [the county] could
have done with the security room and the conditions of his em-
ployment to make life more comfortable, short of giving [the dep-
uty] a blank check and full authority to order a complete rehab of
the building., 210 Basically, "[r]easonable accommodation... does
not require an employer to provide literally everything the dis-
abled employee requests."
2 11
While it would be difficult for a law enforcement agency to
justify a refusal to allow an accommodation which is not excessive,
or likely to create undue hardship or significant risk,212 reasonable
accommodation disputes regularly force both law enforcement
agencies and the courts to make difficult decisions. Controversy
often arises in cases where an accommodation might facially ap-
pear to be unreasonable, yet possibly not so unreasonable after
closer investigation. A good example of such a situation involved
a thirteen-year veteran police officer who allegedly was fired by
the Jersey Village (Texas) Police Department for refusing to wear
a bulletproof vest while on duty.213 Suffering from an alleged acid
reflux disability, i.e., acute heartburn, the officer claimed that the
vest aggravated his condition.214
Granted, the officer's refusal to wear a bulletproof vest does
appear questionable considering the increased risk accompanying
such a decision.2 * Regardless, this situation presents a difficultcase in light of the fact that approximately 40% to 50% of the po-
209. ld. at 112.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 110.
212. See, e.g., Todd R. Wallack, Beavercreek Officer Sues Department, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 14, 1994, at Z61 (describing how a patrol officer with a spinal
disease filed suit after his department refused to accommodate him by allowing him
to wear a lightweight nylon equipment belt used by other nearby departments).
213. See Gary Taylor, Cop Stopped by Gas Attack, NAT'L L.J., May 6, 1996, at
A23; see also Deborah Tedford, Bulletproof Vest Cited in Officer's Suit, HOUs.
CHRON., Mar. 16, 1996, at A29.
214. See Taylor, supra note 213, at A23.
215. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED 1994, at 7-
8 (1996) [hereinafter LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED 1994]
(explaining that the risk of fatality for officers shot in the torso while not wearing
body armor is 14 times higher than for officers wearing body armor).
It has been estimated that "since 1974, approximately 1,800 officers were
spared death by wearing body armor." Jim Stingl, Body Armor Offers Some Protec-
tion, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Sept. 10, 1996, at News 9.
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NO ONE IS ABOVE THE LAW
lice officers in the United States do not even have bullet resistant
216vests. Moreover, 209, or 32%, of the 653 officers killed in the
line of duty by a firearm between 1985 and 1994 were wearing
body armor. 7 Although the Jersey Village officer's refusal to
wear a bulletproof vest does contribute to an increased risk of in-
jury and danger, statistical evidence indicates that it is more diffi-
cult to say whether permitting him to forego wearing the vest
would amount to an unreasonable accommodation or create a di-
rect threat. Similarly, it would be debatable whether business
necessity truly could justify a mandatory bulletproof vest policy.
21 9
The greatest debate regarding reasonable accommodation and
law enforcement involves the issue of officers who become dis-
abled during the course of their employment. Although it is typi-
cally true that there is no requirement that a law enforcement
agency create a "light-duty" position for officers who become dis-
abledm more than one disabled officer has alleged that his disabil-
216. See Interview by Leslie Winokur with Jonathan Spiller, President and Chief
Executive of American Body Armor & Equipment, Dow Jones Investor Network
(Mar. 18, 1996), available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 9516834.
217. See LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED 1994, supra note
215, at 17 tbl. 7.
218. Currently there are more than 673,000 federal, state, and local law enforce-
ment officers in the United States. See REAVES, CENSUS, supra note 4, at 1; REAVES,
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, supra note 4, at 1. In comparison, 708 fed-
eral, state, and local law enforcement officers were killed between 1985 and 1994.
See LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED 1994, supra note 215, at
15. Specifically, firearms were involved in 653, or 92%, of those deaths; 209, or 32%,
of the firearm fatality victims were wearing body armor; 306, or 47%, of the firearm
fatalities resulted from head wounds; 307, or 47%, firearm deaths were caused by
upper torso wounds; and 40, or 6%, of the fatalities resulted from gun shot wounds
below the waist. See id at 17 tbl. 7. During the same ten-year period, a total of
33,166 state and local officers were assaulted with a firearm, while roughly 8,758, or
26%, of those officers were injured. See id. at 73. Incidentally, it should be pointed
out that body armor also has been known to provide protection against injuries from
knife attacks and automobile accidents.
219. See generally LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
STATISTICS, supra note 21, at 15-16 (describing the body armor policies of individual
state and local law enforcement agencies); REAVES, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS,
supra note 4, at 15 (explaining that 37% of local police departments in 1993 required
some or all regular field officers to wear body armor); REAVES, SHERIFFS' DE-
PARTMENTS, supra note 4, at 16 (stating that 35% of sheriffs' departments in 1993
required some deputies or officers to wear body armor while on duty).
220. See Hardy v. Village of Piermont, 923 F. Supp. 604, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that it would go beyond "reasonable assistance" for the Village of Pier-
mont, New York, to create a "light duty" position for a police officer who was unable
to run or walk long distances (citations omitted)); see also Rucker v. City of Phila-
delphia, No. CIV.94-0364, 1995 WL 464312 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1995) (granting defen-
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ity could be accommodated merely by permitting him to work in
an administrative, clerical, or supervisory position within the de-
partment.?2 It is reasonable to speculate, however, that a plaintiff
arguing for this type of accommodation will be more likely to suc-
ceed when he or she is employed by a large organization. Logi-
cally, a large metropolitan police or sheriff's department will be
better equipped to accommodate and reassign an officer to a less
physically demanding position, especially compared to a small ru-
ral department which relies on all of its officers to perform patrol
dant's summary judgment motion because the city had no duty to place a youth de-
tention counselor on "limited duty," despite his suffering three back injuries that
prevented him from performing strenuous activity); Howell v. Michelin Tire Corp.,
860 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 (M.D. Ala. 1994) ("Reasonable accommodation... does not
require that an employer create a light-duty position or a new permanent position.").
See generally Village Needn't Create Light Duty Police Position, NAT'L L.J., June 3,
1996, at B18 (reporting on the Hardy decision).
Since October 31, 1992, federal agencies must offer to reassign disabled em-
ployees to funded, vacant positions located in the same commuting area as long as
the reassignment does not impose undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g)
(1996).
221. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text. See generally Gregory J.
Kramer & Barbara Dillon, The Light Duty Dilemma, 12 LABOR LAW. 247,252 (1996)
(discussing the types of light duty positions to which an employer could assign an
injured employee); Recruitment, Hiring and Promotion Practices for Minorities,
Women and Persons with Disabilities: Report Before the House Permanent Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (Sept. 19, 1996), available in Westlaw, 1996 WL
538976 (testimony of Robert M. Bryant, Assistant Director, National Security Divi-
sion, FBI) (testifying that as of June 30, 1996, 97 veteran special agents with disabili-
ties were employed by the FBI, including one agent who uses a wheelchair and
whose "work is limited to training, analysis and coordination of various operations in
the field office in which he works"); Paul De La Garza, Injured Officer Faces Job
Loss, ST. PrERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 29, 1993, at CTI (reporting that the Tampa Po-
lice Department cannot continue to assign injured officers to light-duty assignments
indefinitely because it is facing a hiring freeze and it must make room for able-
bodied officers); Marty Rosen, Injured Officers File EEOC Complaints Over Firing
Policy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 21, 1992, at B3 (describing how three injured
Tampa police officers filed federal discrimination complaints because of the Tampa
Police Department's unwillingness to assign them desk jobs held by able-bodied offi-
cers).
222. See, e.g., United States v. City of Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Colo. 1996)
(concluding that because the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement in-
cludes reassignment, the City of Denver violated the ADA by refusing to reassign
disabled police officers to either available positions for which they are qualified
within the police department, or available nonpolice positions for which they are
qualified within the City of Denver); Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 911 F. Supp.
1524 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that it was not unreasonable for a police department
with only three detectives to no longer permit a visually impaired detective to con-
duct field investigations when the detective could not drive or conduct an investiga-
tion by himself).
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duty. Because of the unique nature of each law enforcement
agency, requests for reasonable accommodation will have to be
decided on a case by case basis.24
V. THE HIRING PROCESS
A. Preemployment Disability Inquiries
1. General prohibitions
Following the passage of the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act, the hiring process now presents a greater challenge for law
enforcement agencies. This challenge results from the fact that
law enforcement agencies are being forced to abandon the historic
practice of requesting applicants to reveal medical or disability-
related information at the pre-offer stage of the hiring process.
Specifically, the pre-offer stage is any point in the hiring process
occurring before the applicant is given a bona fide job offer;
however, an offer can be conditioned upon the applicant passing a
medical exam and submitting to disability inquiries conducted in
the post-offer phase of the hiring process (meaning after the offer
has been made, but before the individual actually starts to work). 227
223. See generally REAVES, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, supra note 4, at 3
(providing the following information: 75% of police officers were assigned to re-
spond to calls in jurisdictions with 10,000 to 24,999 residents; 85% in jurisdictions
with 2500 to 9999 residents; and 95% in jurisdictions with under 2500 residents).
224. See, e.g., Kemp v. Monge, 919 F. Supp. 404 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (explaining that
a judgment in the amount of $295,000 plus interest and costs was entered in favor of
a sheriff's detective following the refusal of the Sarasota Sheriff's Office to accom-
modate his hearing impairment); Robert E. Kessler, Injured Suffolk Cops Win
$200,000 Court Settlement, NEWSDAY, Mar. 19, 1997, at A38 (describing how a fed-
eral jury awarded three police officers a total of $200,000 because of the Suffolk
County Police Department's violations of the ADA).
225. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 72-73 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355.
226. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902 (1995) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE MANUAL] ("In order
for a job offer to be considered bona fide, an employer should have evaluated all
relevant non-medical information which, from a practical and legal perspective,
could reasonably have been analyzed prior to extending the offer."). EEOC investi-
gators receive guidance from the Compliance Manual when investigating disability
discrimination claims. See Kevin G. Martin, Employment Law, 46 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 499, 518 (1995).
227. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (1994);
28 C.F.R. § 42.513(c) (1996) (Rehabilitation Act); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1996)
(ADA Title I); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(c) (1996) (Rehabilitation Act).
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At the pre-offer phase of the hiring process, the ADA speci-
fies that a covered entity "shall not.., make inquiries of a job
applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a dis-
ability or as to the nature or severity of such disability." M Simi-
larly, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits most pre-employment dis-
ability-related inquiries.22 According to the EEOC, these
prohibitions mean that an employer may not ask "disability-
related questions" at the pre-offer phase of the hiring process.2 ° It
is acceptable, however, to "make preemployment inquiries into
the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions."' 3' In
order to avoid violating the restrictions of the ADA and Rehabili-
tation Act, many law enforcement agencies need to scrutinize and
possibly revise their current hiring procedures, application forms,
testing methods, and interview questions.
2. The justification for prohibiting pre-offer disability inquiries
Although some might criticize the restriction on pre-offer dis-
ability inquiries, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act otherwise
would offer only limited protection against disability discrimina-
tion. When adopting the ADA Congress recognized that many
Americans have "hidden disabilities" that are not readily apparent
to employers such as "epilepsy, diabetes, emotional illness, heart
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13; see, e.g., Grenier v. Cy-
anamid Plastics, Ina, 70 F.3d 667, 672-74 (1st Cir. 1995); Thompson v. Borg-Warner
Protective Servs. Corp., No. CIV.94-4015-MHP, 1996 WL 162990, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 11, 1996); Thomas v. Mississippi State Dep't of Health, 934 F. Supp. 768, 773
(S.D. Miss. 1996); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, 920 F. Supp. 1153,
1154 (D. Colo. 1996); Susie v. Apple Tree Preschool and Child Care Ctr., 866 F.
Supp. 390, 397 (N.D. Iowa 1994); Lowe v. Angelo's Italian Foods, Ina, No.
CIV.A.93-1233-FGT, 1993 WL 560905, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 8,1993).
229. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.55, 42.513(a); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a); see, e.g., Doe v. Syra-
cuse Sch. Dist., 508 F. Supp. 333,336-37 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
230. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ADA ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: PREEMPLOYMENT DISABILITY-RELATED QUESTIONS AND MEDICAL
EXAMINATIONS 1-2 (rev. Oct. 10, 1995) [hereinafter EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE]. See generally Grenier, 70 F.3d at 673 (stating that the Enforcement
Guidance "is not binding law, but as a detailed analysis of the relevant ADA provi-
sions, it aids our interpretation of the statute"); Mary E. Sharp, Comment, The Hid-
den Disability that Finds Protection Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Em-
ploying the Mentally Impaired, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 899, 900 (1996) (explaining
that the EEOC released guidelines on preemployment disability-related questions in
order to address ambiguities in the ADA).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B); see 28 C.F.R. § 42.513(a) (Rehabilitation Act); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (ADA Title I); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a) (Rehabilitation Act); see
also Schuman, supra note 12, at 502.
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disease, and cancer. ''1 2 Congress also realized that information
about the existence of a disability was "often used to exclude ap-
plicants with disabilities-particularly those with so-called hidden
disabilities .. before their ability to perform the job was even
evaluated." ' In order to discourage employers from stereotyping
applicants and prematurely rejecting potentially qualified indi-
viduals with disabilities, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act now
require employers first to consider whether an applicant actually is
qualified prior to deciding whether to hire or reject the applicant.2
Without a prohibition on pre-offer disability inquiries, most
individuals with disabilities would never know the true reason be-
hind a negative employment determination. In the past an appli-
cant "did not necessarily know whether he or she was rejected be-
cause of disability, or because of insufficient skills or experience or
a bad report from a reference."' 5 For instance, an employer could
simply say that the applicant did not interview very well, as op-
posed to admitting that the person was really rejected after having
revealed disability-related information. By restricting the ability
of an employer to make disability inquiries in the pre-offer phase
of the hiring process, there will be little question that a post-offer
revelation of the person's disability status must have influenced
the employer's subsequent withdrawal of the employment offer.
As a result, employers must be prepared to legally justify the with-
drawal of an employment offer as they will no longer be able to so
easily deny the fact that the applicant's disability was a motivating
factor23
232. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 72 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 305; id., pt. 3, at 42 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 465.
233. Id., pt. 2, at 72, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 305; id., pt. 3, at 42, re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,465.
234. See generally Doe, 508 F. Supp. at 336-37 (stating that by limiting "the scope
of preemployment inquiries relating to a potential employee's handicap ... an em-
ployer is required to base the hiring decision on a person's actual job qualifications,
rather than on any perceived limitations"); Sondra M. Lopez-Aguado, The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act: The Undue Hardship Defense and Insurance Costs, 12
REV. LITIG. 249, 263 (1992) (explaining that the prohibition against preemployment
disability inquiries "is to assure that the employment selection process does not be-
come biased by misconceptions regarding the applicant's ability to perform").
235. EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 1.
236. The employer should be prepared to demonstrate that the justification for
the rejection is "job-related and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. §
12112(d)(4)(A); see supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
April 1997] 1031
1032 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
3. Illegal pre-offer inquiries
Despite the general prohibitions against most pre-offer dis-
ability inquiries, many employers continue to make them. One
possible explanation is traditional resistance to change, as well as a
general unwillingness of employers to abandon and revise existing
hiring practices. Another explanation is the possibility that em-
ployers still do not really understand what types of questions are
permissible and what types are prohibited.
, According to the EEOC, a disability-related question "means
a question that is likely to elicit information about a disability. ' ' 37
Therefore, any pre-offer inquiry directly asking an applicant to re-
veal a medical condition or disability status clearly is prohibited.
For example, an employer may not ask questions such as, "Do you
have a heart condition?" or "Have you ever been addicted to
drugs? ' ' s Similarly, an employer should not ask whether an appli-
cant has ever experienced or been treated for "any 'migraine, neu-
ralgia, nervous breakdown, or psychiatric treatment. ' ' Instead
of focusing on the disabilities of an applicant, an employer's ques-
tions should focus on the abilities of the applicant.24
Because "[p]re-employment inquiries are only allowed when
they relate to job-related functions,"24' employers must avoid ask-
ing questions merely for the purpose of satisfying their own curios-
ity. At the pre-offer stage, therefore, a conscientious employer
must resist the temptation to make follow-up inquiries in situations
242
where an applicant voluntarily reveals disability information.
For instance, if an applicant were to voluntarily reveal that he or
237. EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 4.
238. In the past it was not uncommon for a law enforcement agency to ask a
question that is now considered illegal: "'Do you have any physical, mental or medi-
cal impairment or disability that would limit your job performance for the position
for which you are applying?' Palmer v. City of Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 1507 n.10
(10th Cir. 1994) (quoting a question a police officer was asked before he was hired
by the police department in Monticello, Utah).
239. Doe, 508 F. Supp. at 335 (quoting an illegal question asked on an employ-
ment application).
240. EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 13, § 5.5(d), at V-9.
241. See Black, supra note 59, at 118.
242. But see infra notes 261, 267 and accompanying text (explaining that in some
situations an employer may ask about the need for reasonable accommodation).
Even in cases where an applicant voluntarily reveals medical information, the em-
ployer is obligated to keep the information confidential. See EEOC, ADA EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 22; cf 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d)(3)(B)
(requiring the confidential treatment of medical information obtained during an
employment entrance examination).
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she had once experienced a stroke, the employer should not re-
spond by asking any of the following types of questions: "What
was it like to have a stroke?"; "What exactly were the effects of
your stroke?"; or "What are the chances of you having another
one?" Likewise, the employer must avoid asking irrelevant ques-
tions which could embarrass or humiliate the disabled applicant.243
Additionally, the EEOC has interpreted the ADA and Re-
habilitation Act as prohibiting questions that are closely related to
a disability inquiry.244 For example, an employer may not make
indirect disability inquiries by asking applicants about their work-
ers' compensation history.245 Likewise, an employer should not ask
an applicant, who is a veteran of the armed forces, whether he or
she received a medical discharge from the military.2" An em-
ployer also should not ask the applicant whether he or she receives
disability compensation from the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs.247 Although an employer may ask an applicant whether he or
she drinks alcohol, an applicant should not be asked to specify ex-
actly how much alcohol he or she consumes each week.2" Un-
243. See, e.g., Jeff Barge, Job Interview Can Bring ADA Liability, 82 A.B.A. J. 34
(quoting Jim Passamano, an EEOC senior trial attorney: "The moral to the story is
that if you ask offensive questions that humiliate and embarrass [people], they can
be compensated for that.").
244. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 4. Currently,
the Houston Police Department asks applicants to list any restrictions on their driv-
ers licenses. See Houston Police Dep't, Applicant Screening Checklist 3 (on file with
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Considering the fact that almost all restric-
tions are disability related, this sort of pre-offer question seems to violate the ADA
and Rehabilitation Act.
245. See EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 13, § 5.5, at V-8.
246. The State of Florida asks veterans, who are applicants for the Florida High-
way Patrol, to indicate whether they received a medical discharge from the military.
See State of Florida, Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Supplemental
Application for Highway Patrol Officers 6 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review). Clearly this question is illegal because the receipt of a medical dis-
charge indicates that the former soldier, sailor, Marine, or airman was classified as
"unfit to perform the duties of his [military] office, grade, rank, or rating because of
physical disability." 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1206 (1994). Essentially, this question is no
different than asking an applicant to indicate whether he or she is a disabled veteran.
247. As of 1995, 2.2 million of the United States' 26.1 million veterans received
disability compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs for service-
connected disabilities. See Tamar A. Mehuran, Veterans, AIR FORCE MAG., Mar.
1996, at 44. See generally Anne E. Beaumont, Note, This Estoppel Has Got To Stop:
Judicial Estoppel and The Americans with Disabilities Act, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1529
(1996) (arguing that individuals receiving government disability entitlements should
be neither precluded from arguing that they are protected by the ADA, nor es-
topped from arguing that they are in fact otherwise qualified).
248. See generally Thompson, 1996 WL 162990, at *7 (stating that an "employer
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avoidably, these types of requests are likely to elicit information
about whether the applicant has a disability.
Another prohibited pre-offer inquiry would involve asking a
law enforcement applicant about lawful drug use. Commonly, the
disclosure of a particular medication would be indicative of the
underlying medical condition. "For example, if the applicant re-
sponds that he or she is taking AZT, insulin or tamoxafin, the em-
ployer has, in effect, been informed that the applicant has been di-
agnosed as being HIV-positive, or having diabetes or breast
cancer, respectively." 249  In other situations the disclosure of a
medication used to treat multiple medical conditions might lead
the employer to draw an incorrect conclusion about the applicant's
particular medical diagnosis. For instance, if an applicant were to
state, "I regularly take the drug Nortriptyline (Pamelor) pursuant
to my doctor's orders," the employer might incorrectly assume
that the individual suffers from depression. Although Nortrip-
tyline most commonly is used to treat depression, it sometimes is
prescribed for individuals with a history of migraine headaches. 2'
One court has addressed the legality of questioning current
employees about legal drug use and determined that "a policy that
requires employees to disclose the prescription medication they
use would force the employees to reveal their disabilities (or per-
ceived disabilities) to their employer. ' ' Likewise, this sort of in-
quiry also would force applicants to reveal their disabilities.
Furthermore, an employer may not ask a third party any
questions that it could not directly ask the applicant. 2 Law en-
may ask about drinking habits, to the extent that the question is not likely to reveal
whether the applicant is an alcoholic"). At the pre-offer stage, an employer similarly
should avoid asking in-depth questions about an applicant's past use of illegal drugs.
See id.
249. Loder v. City of Glendale, 47 Cal. App. 4th 592, 603, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 94, 105
(1994). See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Workplace Drug Testing: A Case Study in
the Misapplication of Technology, 5 HARv. J.L. & TEcH. 65, 78 (1991) (explaining
that "an employee testing positive for barbiturates may be taking phenobarbital pur-
suant to a physician's prescription to help control epilepsy").
250. See JAMES W. LONG, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 715
(1991).
251. Roe, 920 F. Supp. at 1154. A policy of asking employees about prescription
medications "would be permissible if [the employer] could demonstrate that its pre-
scription medication inquiry is 'job-related and consistent with business necessity."'
Id. at 1155. See generally Julie Gannon Shoop, Employers Can't Ask About Pre-
scription Drug Use, Court Holds, TRIAL, Apr. 1996, at 15-16 (discussing the holding
of Roe).
252. See Grenier, 70 F.3d at 676 (citing EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: PREEMPLOYMENT DISABILITY-
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forcement agencies which elect to conduct background investiga-
tions or reference checks prior to making employment offers must
be mindful of this prohibition. For example, a law enforcement
agency should not ask an applicant's previous employer about how
many days the applicant was sick.253 It is illegal to ask a third party
this type of question because the inquiry is related directly to the
severity of the individual's potential impairments, and it is likely to
elicit information about a disability.
4. Affirmative action and self-identification
There is one primary exception to the rule that employers are
prohibited from making pre-offer disability inquiries. In accor-
dance with an affirmative action program mandated by federal,
state, or local law, an employer is permitted to ask an applicant to
voluntaril "self-identify" him or herself as an individual with a
disability. Whenever an employer requests individuals to self-
identify, the employer incurs specific obligations: the information
can only be used to benefit the individual with a disability; the
employer must clearly state that the disclosure is completely vol-
untary and that it will only be used for affirmative action purposes;
the disclosed information must be kept confidential; and the dis-
ability information must be maintained separate from the appli-
cant's main application.25 An employer fundamentally should not
ask applicants to voluntarily self-identify unless the employer truly
intends to use the information to benefit the applicants.
5. Legal pre-offer inquiries
Although law enforcement agencies are restricted in their
ability to make disability-related pre-offer inquiries, they are still
free to "make preemployment inquiries into the ability of an ap-
RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (1994)); Schuman, supra note 12, at 504.
253. But see generally Thomas H. Wright, Pre-Employment Background Investi-
gations, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Nov. 1991, at 16, 19 (explaining that in order
to conduct a thorough background investigation, the investigating officer should ask
an applicant's previous employers about the applicant's use of sick leave).
254. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 12; see, e.g.,
38 U.S.C. § 4214 (1994) (requiring federal agencies to grant hiring preference to dis-
abled veterans). Employers also may engage in voluntary affirmative action. See 45
C.F.R. § 84.6(b).
255. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.513(b)(1)-(2); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(b)(1)-(2); EEOC, ADA
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 12-13.
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plicant to perform job-related functions." 6 While one court has
recognized that there is a fine line between the types of inquiries
which are legal and those that are illegal,5 cautious employers can
effectively avoid this potential _predicament by merely choosing to
limit their pre-offer inquiries." Once a bona fide offer has been
made, the employer can then make the necessary inquiries. 5'
Despite the restrictions of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act,
there still is a rather wide range of questions that can be posed to
applicants. As an illustration, it would be permissible for an em-
ployer to describe the essential functions of the relevant position
and then ask the applicant whether he or she could perform those
functions with or without reasonable accommodation.2,0 Because
the preceding question asks whether the job could be performed
with or without reasonable accommodation, it is not the same as
asking the applicant if he or she would in fact require reasonable
accommodation. Although an employer may ask applicants
whether they will need reasonable accommodation for the hiring
process, 1 the employer generally should not yet ask applicants
whether they also will need reasonable accommodation for the ac-
tual job.262
Employers also "may ask an applicant to describe or demon-
strate how, with or without reasonable accommodation, the appli-
cant will be able to perform job-related functions. ' 263 Typically,
however, the employer should not make this request unless all
256. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B); see 28 C.F.R. § 42.513(a) (Rehabilitation Act); 45
C.F.R. § 84.14(a) (Rehabilitation Act); Schuman, supra note 12, at 502.
257. See Thompson, 1996 WL 162990, at *8.
258. See generally John J. Coleman, III & Marcel L. Debruge, A Practitioner's In-
troduction To ADA Title I1, 45 ALA. L. REV. 55, 82 n.172 (1993) (stating that "an
employer should be cautious in deciding whether to ask an applicant anything").
259. Even though the employer can make post-offer disability inquiries, any ac-
quired disability information can only be used in a manner which is not contrary to
the antidiscrimination requirements of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. See infra
notes 278-281 and accompanying text.
260. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 4; Chai
Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: A View From the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 537 n.98 (1991). The employer,
however, should not ask the applicant whether he or she has a disability which would
interfere with the performance of the described essential functions. See id. Asking
such a question would be a "sugar-coat[ed]" way of asking the applicant if he or she
has a disability. See id.
261. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 5.
262. See Grenier, 70 F.3d at 674; EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra
note 230, at 6; infra note 264 and accompanying text.
263. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a).
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applicants in the same job category are also asked to do this.2 4 In
cases where an applicant's disability is either obvious or known, 2 5
the employer may ask the particular applicant to describe or dem-
onstrate how he or she would perform the job, regardless of
whether other applicants are asked this same question.20 At the
same time, "the ADA does not preclude an employer from asking
an applicant with a known disability who seeks a reasonable ac-
commodation to specify the type of accommodation he seeks.,
267
Moreover, employers can ask applicants about their arrest or
conviction records.26 For instance, an employer could ask such
questions as, "Have you ever been convicted of a DUI/DWI?", or
"Have you ever been arrested for possession of illegal drugs?"
An employer also may ask an applicant about prior illegal
drug use as long as the questions are "not likely to elicit informa-
tion about a disability.",269 For example, questions like "Have you
ever used illegal drugs?", or "When was the last time you used il-
legal drugs?" would be permissible inquiries because they are not
likely to reveal whether the applicant was or is a drug addict.270 On
the other hand, a question like, "How many times have you ever
used illegal drugs?" would be impermissible due to the likelihood
of the answer revealing whether the applicant has ever been ad-
dicted to illegal drugs.'
Regardless of the fact that it is entirely legal for an employer
to make select job-related inquiries at the pre-offer stage, an em-
ployer cannot completely eliminate the risk that one of its current
employees might ask an inappropriate or illegal question. Short of
making no pre-offer inquiries, the most effective way for an em-
ployer to reduce this risk would be to thoroughly educate its per-
sonnel about the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Another possible
264. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 5.
265. For example, the applicant might have voluntarily disclosed his or her hidden
disability.
266. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 5.
267. Grenier, 70 F.3d at 677. The employer should realize that pre-offer questions
about reasonable accommodation can be used "as evidence that the employer knew
about the need for reasonable accommodation" and the EEOC will carefully scruti-
nize cases where the applicant later claims that the refusal to hire was based on the
need for reasonable accommodation. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE,
supra note 230, at 7.
268. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 9.
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approach would be for the employer to supply its interviewing per-
sonnel with preapproved questions and strictly prohibit them from
making stray remarks-and then hope for the best.
B. Medical Examinations
1. Pre-offer and post-offer medical examinations
Similar to the prohibition against pre-offer disability inquiries,
covered employers also are not permitted to conduct medical ex-
aminations prior to making a conditional job offer.72 Because of
the significance of whether a test or procedure is a prohibited
medical exam, the EEOC has provided factors that should be con-
sidered when making this determination:
[1.] Is it administered by a health care professional or
someone trained by a health care professional?;
[2.] Are the results interpreted by a health care profes-
sional or someone trained by a health care professional?;
[3.] Is it designed to reveal an impairment of physical or
mental health?;
[4.] Is the employer trying to determine the applicant's
physical or mental health impairments?;
[5.] Is it invasive (for example, does it require the draw-
ing of blood, urine or breath)?;
[6.] Does it measure an applicant's performance of a task,
or does it measure the applicant's physiological responses
to performing the task?;
[7.] Is it normally given in a medical setting (for example,
a health care professional's office)?;
[8.] Is medical equipment used?m
Essentially, a case-by-case analysis will be required when attempt-
ing to determine whether a test or procedure truly is a medical
272. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A)
(1994); 28 C.F.R. § 41.55 (1996) (Rehabilitation Act); id. § 42.513(a); 29 C.F.R. §
1630.13(a) (1996) (ADA Title I); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a) (1996) (Rehabiliation Act);
Buchanan v. City of San Antonio, 85 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1996); Grenier v. Cy-
anamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 671-72 (1st Cir. 1995); Doe v. Chicago, 883 F.
Supp. 1126, 1135 (N.D. Ill. 1994); EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra
note 230, at 14; EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 13, § 6.2. See
generally Brumley v. Pena, 62 F.3d 277, 279 (8th Cir. 1995) (involving a claim that a
medical exam violated the Rehabilitation Act).
273. EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 14.
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exam.
4
Once a conditional job offer is made, the employer may con-
duct medical examinations and make disability inquiries subject to
a few basic limitations. First, all applicants in the same job cate-
gory should be subjected to the examination or inquiry.27 Second,
the newly acquired medical and disability information must be
"collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate
medical files" (or, in other words, in files separate from the appli-
cant's primary applicant file).l 6 Third, the collected information
must be protected and treated as confidential.277 Fourth, the re-
sults of the medical examination and inquiry may only be used in a
manner consistent with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.278
Despite these four basic restrictions, employers are not lim-
ited in terms of the scope of the medical exam that can be adminis-
tered to applicants. For instance, not every medical test or proce-
dure has to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.27 9
Nevertheless, an employer can only withdraw an offer based on in-
formation which indicates that the applicant is not otherwise
qualified for the position.2" If the employer wants to use the test
results or other medical criteria to screen out an applicant with
disabilities, the employer must be prepared to show that the rele-
274. In some cases the presence of a single factor might even establish that a test
or procedure is a medical exam. See id.
275. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 42.513(c)(1) (Rehabilitation
Act); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (ADA Title I); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(c)(1) (Rehabilitation
Act); EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 18. It is acceptable
to conduct more in-depth or follow-up exams on select applicants whenever their
initial exams reveal relevant information. See id.
276. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B); see 28
C.F.R. § 42.513(d) (Rehabilitation Act); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1) (ADA Title I); 45
C.F.R. § 84.14(d) (Rehabilitation Act).
277. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B); 28 C.F.R. § 42.513(d) (Rehabilitation Act);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1) (ADA Title I); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(d) (Rehabilitation Act).
In limited circumstances the information can be disclosed to select individuals. See
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(i)-(iii); see also EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE,
supra note 230, at 21 (describing the limited exceptions in which medical information
may be disclosed).
278. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(C); 28 C.F.R. § 42.513(c)(2) (Rehabilitation
Act); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(2) (ADA Title I); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(c)(2)
(Rehabilitation Act). See generally Feldblum, supra note 260, at 532-33, 537-38
(discussing the impact of the Rehabilitation Act and ADA upon post-offer medical
exams); Matthew J. Mitten, AIDS and Athletics, 3 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 22
(1993) (discussing post-offer medical exams).
279. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3).
280. See id.
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vant test or criteria is "job-related and consistent with business ne-
cessity, and performance of the essential job functions cannot be
accomplished with reasonable accommodation."' 1
In light of the mentioned restrictions, an employer receives no
real benefit from administering tests or making inquiries that are
not job-related and consistent with business necessity. Addition-
ally, an employer would be well advised to voluntarily limit the
scope of the exam. By taking such action, the employer avoids
learning about irrelevant and unusable information. Furthermore,
the employer reduces the amount of information that it must safe-
guard, which therebydecreases its risk of illegally disclosing confi-
dential information.
At the same time, law enforcement agencies would be wise to
treat medical information much the same way the United States
military treats classified information. In the military even indi-
viduals holding a top-secret security clearance are only given ac-
cess to classified information on a need-to-know basis. Similarly,
employers should adopt specific measures designed to ensure that
medical information is only revealed to those individuals having a
legitimate need to know about the applicant's medical history or
disability status. The bottom line is that employers should go to
considerable lengths to ensure that medical information is never
treated in a casual way or protected in a loose manner. When im-
plementing a need-to-know policy, the most important and fun-
damental principle to remember is that most people will not have a
need to know the confidential disability-related information. By
adopting such a policy, an employer could substantially reduce the
likelihood of violating its statutorily imposed duty to safegaurd
medical information.
2. Psychological tests
Law enforcement agencies are increasingly using psychologi-
cal tests in the hiring process.m For example, sixty-four percent of
state police departments and seventy-three percent of municipal
281. Id.; see also supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (discussing the prohibi-
tions against disparate impact discrimination).
282. See Feldblum, supra note 260, at 538 (explaining that unnecessary and irrele-
vant questions "simply increase the amount of information the employer must en-
sure is not inadvertently disclosed").
283. See George E. Hargrave et al., F+4+9+Cn: An MMPI Measure of Aggression
in Law Enforcement Officers and Applicants, 16 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 268 (1988)
[hereinafter Hargrave, F+4+9+Cn].
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police departments required applicants to undergo psychological
testing in 1990.m Moreover, some states even statutorily mandate
that psychological testing occur before an individual can receive a
law enforcement position or participate in law enforcement train-
ing.m
The term "psychological test" often means any one of a num-
ber of tests used for such various purposes as attempts to assess
personality, honesty, integrity, mental health, or emotional well-
being.2" In most cases law enforcement agencies view psychologi-
cal testing as a valuable means of reducing incidents of future po-
lice brutality, increase public confidence in the individuals selected
for law enforcement employment, and avoid or reduce their liabil-
ity exposure in brutality lawsuits.2 At the same time, agencies
seemingly administer psychological tests in a more general attempt
to predict which applicants will turn out to be "rotten apples." 218
Every law enforcement agency needs to realize that the ad-
ministration of psychological tests must comply with the require-
ments of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.2 9 A law enforce-
ment agency, therefore, should consider whether it can even
administer the desired psychological test at the pre-offer stage of
the hiring process. According to one congressional committee,
"[t]he prohibition against pre-offer medical examinations also
284. See Philip Ash et al., Police Agency Officer Selection Practices, 17 J. POLICE
ScI. & ADMIN. 258,263 (1990).
285. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1031(0 (West 1996); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-31-
303(5)(b) (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5605(f) (1995); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
30:4-24, 40A:14-146.10 (1996); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-8-102, 38-8-106(9) (1996);
TEx. GOV'T CODE § 415.052(a)(4) (West 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-704(b)(vii)
(Michie 1996).
286. See e.g., Ash et al., supra note 284, at 264 (explaining that "the line between
'honesty' tests ... and 'personality' tests has at times become very blurred"); Black,
supra note 59, at 69 (stating that "[p]ersonality tests are a form of psychological
testing"); Burbeck & Furnham, supra note 146, at 68 ("Psychological testing may be
useful for selecting out people suffering from some mental abnormality."); Jonathan
R. Mook, Personality Testing in Today's Workplace: Avoiding the Legal Pitfalls, 22
EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 65 (1996) ("For a number of years, employers have used per-
sonality and psychological tests to assess the honesty of job applicants .... ).
287. See Michelle A. Travis, Note, Psychological Health Tests for Violence-Prone
Police Officers: Objectives, Shortcomings, and Alternatives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1717,
1719-25 (1994).
288. See William 0. Dwyer et al., Psychological Screening of Law Enforcement
Officers. A Case for Job Relatedness, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 176, 180 (1990).
289. See Travis, supra note 287, at 1741-62 (providing a thorough discussion of the
effects of the ADA upon psychological testing by law enforcement agencies).
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applies to psychological examinations. ' '210 The EEOC has taken a
slightly different position, however, by announcing that an em-
ployer may administer a psychological test at the pre-offer stage as
long as the particular examination is not medical.29
In order to predict whether a pre-offer examination is medi-
cal, and thereby illegal, the EEOC has provided specific factors
that should be considered when making this determination.29 As
an illustration, one of the factors involves asking, "Is it [i.e., the
test] designed to reveal an impairment of physical or mental
health?" 29  Similarly, the EEOC believes that a psychological ex-
amination is medical in nature if the test provides "evidence that
would lead to identifying a mental disorder or impairment."
'29 4
Basically, only a case-by-case analysis will determine whether a
particular psychological test is medical or nonmedical; but even in
cases where a pre-offer psychological test is not classified as medi-
cal, it cannot involve disability-related inquiries. 25
The issue of psychological testing is just beginning to be ad-
dressed by the judicial system in connection with the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. For instance, in Thompson v. Borg-Warner
296Protective Services Corporation, a security guard applicant wasrequired to take a multiple choice test designed to predict those
290. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 46 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 465; see also Grenier, 70 F.3d at 675 (citing House Report 485 in support of the
prohibition against pre-offer psychological examinations).
291. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 16.
292. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
293. EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 14. See generally
Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1366 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that "[p]ersonality
tests [such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and the Ror-
schach] are an accepted and reliable diagnostic indicator of bipolar disorder"); Jack
Aylward, Psychological Testing and Police Selection, 13 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN.
201, 205 (1985) (indicating that the purpose of the Manson Evaluation is to "identify
people whose behavior and personality structure indicated that they were alcoholics
or had serious alcohol problems"); Dwyer et al., supra note 288, at 178 (explaining
that the most widely used psychological evaluation for police officers, the MMPI,
was developed for "the purpose of identifying major psychiatric disorders"); Eliza-
beth J. Shusman et al., A Cross-Validation Study of Police Recruit Performance as
Predicted by the IPI and MMPI, 15 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 162, 163 (1987) (stating
that "the MMPI appears to be an excellent gauge of pathological behaviors" while
the Inwald Personality Inventory was designed to measure alcohol and drug use
along with many other personality attributes).
294. EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 16. A test is not
medical if it is "designed and used to measure only things such as honesty, tastes, and
habits." Id.
295. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
296. No. CIV.A.94-4015-MHP, 1996 WL 162990, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1996).
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individuals presenting "a high risk for problematic behaviors."297
In response to the applicant's claim that the pre-offer test violated
the ADA, the court stated, "The ADA protects disabilities, not
any characteristic which an employer may consider to be a per-
sonal flaw or undesirable aspect of an applicant's personality." 298
Additionally, the court concluded, "[The ADA ought not prohibit
an employer from inquiring into such personal characteristics as
organization and time-management skills... which are not ordi-
narily indicative of a mental impairment."299 After weighing the
EEOC factors, the court ruled that no reasonable jury could find
that the test in question was an unlawful pre-offer medical exam."
In Barnes v. Cochrar0 an applicant for the position of correc-
tions deputy also was required to undergo pre-offer psychological
testing.3  In this case the pre-offer psychological examination was
conducted by a licensed psychologist. ° The examination also in-
volved the applicant and the psychologist discussing the applicant's
combat experiences in Vietnam as well as his history of flashbacks
and blackouts. °4 Although the court agreed that the applicant
failed to prove that he had been rejected due to discriminatory
reasons, the court permanently enjoined the Sheriff of Broward
County, Florida, from "conducting any further preemployment
psychological or physical medical examinations, as described and
297. See id. While taking the PASS-III D.A.T.A. Survey test, the applicant be-
came angry and marked the "?" box for all questions that he believed asked for in-
formation that was none of the employer's "business." See id. at *2. All these re-
sponses were then marked as incorrect. See id.
298. Id. at *6.
299. Id.
300. See id. at *8.
301. 944 F. Supp. 897, 900 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
302. See id. The testing consisted of the following: the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory, the Inwald Personality Inventory, the Otis Lennon School
Ability Test, the Hilson Profile/Success Quotient Test, and the California Psycho-
logical Inventory. Id. at 905.
303. See id. at 901. See generally George E. Hargrave & Deirdre Hiatt, Law En-
forcement Selection with the Interview, MMPI, and CPI: A Study of Reliability and
Validity, 15 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 110 (1987) (explaining that a typical psycho-
logical assessment involves a psychological test battery and a diagnostic interview);
Deirdre Hiatt & George E. Hargrave, Predicting Job Performance Problems with
Psychological Screening, 16 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 122 (1988) ("A major compo-
nent of most psychological screening programs is a clinical interview in which the
psychologist assesses the applicant's background and behavior, integrating informa-
tion with psychological tests.").
304. See Barnes, 944 F. Supp. at 901. Besides making disability related inquiries,
the psychologist also reviewed the applicant's medical records. See id. at 905.
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defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act, the EEOC's regu-
lations, and the guidance materials published by the EEOC."'3 5
Subject to the post-offer requirements *for medical exams,05 an
employer is free to conduct post-offer psychological tests aimed at
detecting psychological disabilities. If an employer intends to
withdraw the offer of employment based upon the psychological
test results, however, the underlying test must be job-related and
consistent with business necessity.3 In some cases this require-
ment could present a potential problem for law enforcement
agencies because there is considerable debate regarding the reli-
ability and validity of using psychological tests in connection with
selecting law enforcement officers.
309
305. Id. at 906. The court determined the pre-offer psychological examination
was medical in nature and a violation of the ADA. See id. at 905.
306. See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
307. See Barnes, 944 F. Supp. at 903; see supra note 227 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text. In Daley v. Koch and Gardiner
v. Mercyhurst College, both plaintiffs were rejected or dismissed because of unfavor-
able results received during a post-offer psychological assessment, which consisted of
an administration of the MMPI and a clinical interview. See Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d
212, 213-14 (1989); Gardiner v. Mercyhurst College, 942 F. Supp. 1050, 1051-52
(W.D. Pa. 1995). Neither plaintiff could challenge the basis for the decision because
neither one was an individual with a covered disability. See supra notes 59-61 and
accompanying text. In Greenberg v. New York the plaintiff was given an unidenti-
fied psychological test. See Greenburg v. New York, 919 F. Supp. 637, 639 (E.D.N.Y.
1996). It also was unclear whether the test was administered in the pre-offer or post-
offer phase. The plaintiff did not challenge the timing of the test as he merely chal-
lenged the findings; however, the challenge was unsuccessful because he was not an
individual with a covered disability. See id. at 643.
309. See Aylward, supra note 293, at 201 ("Researchers have found ... that nei-
ther psychological tests nor standard psychiatric interviews have demonstrated much
in the way of reliable predictability for police work."); Burbeck & Furnham, supra
note 146, at 64 ("[N]o test has been found that discriminates consistently and clearly
between people who will make good police officers and those who will not."); Dwyer
et al., supra note 288, at 176 ("[S]erious questions must be raised as to the value and
even the ethics of [psychological testing] as it is typically performed in police de-
partments across the nation."); Hargrave, F+4+9+Cn, supra note 283, at 268
("Although the MMPI has been widely used for screening peace officer applicants,
little research has been reported on its effectiveness in predicting aggression in this
population."); George Hargrave et al., A Comparison of MMPI and CPI Test Pro-
files for Traffic Officers and Deputy Sheriffs, 14 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 250 (1986)
(explaining that both writers and researchers have come to contradictory conclusions
as to whether there is a police personality). See generally Katrin U. Byford, Com-
ment, The Quest For The Honest Worker: A Proposal For Regulation of Integrity
Testing, 49 SMU L. REV. 329 (1996) (discussing the validity of honesty and integrity
testing). But see Joyce I. McQuilkin et al., Psychological Test Validity for Selecting
Law Enforcement Officers, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 289, 293 (1990) ("The data
suggest that psychological personality tests are valid selection devices for law en-
forcement officers."); Shusman et al., supra note 293, at 169 ("Although no preem-
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3. Physical agility and physical fitness tests
A physical agility test requires an individual to demonstrate
his or her ability to perform actual or simulated job tasks, while a
physical fitness test requires an individual to perform basic physi-
cal tasks. Neither test is considered to be a medical exam as long
as there is no attempt to measure "an applicant's physiological or
biological responses., 310 Therefore, a law enforcement agency is
free to incorporate physical agility and physical fitness testing into
its pre-offer selection process.311 For example, "a police depart-
ment may conduct an agility test to measure a candidate's ability
to walk, run, jump, or lift in relation to specific job duties.
' 3 2
Likewise, a law enforcement agency is permitted to conduct physi-
cal fitness tests designed to measure how well or poorly an appli-
cant performs general physical tasks.
Before conducting either a physical agility or fitness test, the
employer may require the applicant to provide medical documen-
tation simply indicating that he or she can safely participate in the
testing process. 4 Beyond requiring submission of a basic physi-
cian's statement that the applicant can safely participate, the em-
ployer is strictly prohibited from making further medical inquiries.
The employer also may ask the applicant to assume liability for
any injuries incurred during the administration of the tests. 5
ployment psychological screening program can predict how each candidate will later
behave as an officer, preemployment identification of individuals with a high prob-
ability of 'unsuitable' job behavior can save any hiring institution administrative time
and monies.").
310. EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 15.
311. EEOC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 11, at § 1630.14(a) app.; Maselek,
supra note 150, at 687 (explaining that physical agility tests may be administered at
any point in the hiring process); see also Barge, supra note 243, at 34 (quoting Peggy
Mastroianni, director of ADA policy at the EEOC, "The employer can ask about
performance... and if the job requires it,'it can give a physical agility test.").
312. EEOC, TECHNICALASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 13, § 4.4, IV-8.
313. EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 15. The DEA,
for instance, tests the ability of each applicant to perform a minimum number of trig-
ger pulls, pull-ups, sit-ups, and push-ups in a limited amount of time. Drug En-
forcement Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Basic Agent Training (BAT) Pre-
Training Packet 1, attachments I-VII (1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review). The DEA also conducts tests to determine how long it takes each
applicant to complete a 120-yard shuttle run and 2.0 mile run. See id.
314. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 16. Consid-
ering the fact that the employer is prohibited from making general disability inquir-
ies at the pre-offer stage, it seems only reasonable to allow the employer to require
such basic documentation before administering the test.
315. See id.
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Any employer conducting pre-offer physical agility or fitness
tests, however, needs to be mindful of a few basic caveats."6 First,
the employer must be able to show that each test is job related and
consistent with business necessity whenever the tests are used to
screen out individuals with disabilities.317  Second, the employer
must also be prepared to show that neither the tests nor the job it-
self could be successfully performed by the disabled individual if
reasonable accommodations were made. 18 Third, the tests must be
given to all applicants in the same job category, regardless of dis-
ability status.
4. Drug tests
Regarding the issue of drug testing, i.e., drug testing for illegal
drugs, the ADA takes a neutral position. For instance, Title I of
the ADA states that it does not "encourage, prohibit, or authorize
the conducting of drug testing for the illegal use of drugs by job
applicants or employees."' s  Regardless, Title I does declare that
"a test to determine the illegal use of drugs shall not be considered
a medical examination. '' 21 Due to the fact that this sort of drug
316. See Ash et al., supra note 284, at 264 (reporting that physical strength and
agility tests were used by 86.1% and 66.7% of the responding state police agencies
and police departments in the 50 largest cities, respectively).
317. See EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 13, § 4.4, IV-5;
EEOC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 11, at § 1630.14 (a) app.; supra notes 9-13
and accompanying text; see also Ryan v. City of Highland Heights, 4 A.D. Cases
1389 (N.D. Ohio 1995) ("If employers wish to terminate disabled individuals because
they have failed required tests, the employers should be made to justify their tests
according to the standards of § 12113(a)."). See generally REPORT ON PHYSICAL
FITNESS TESTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 122, at 23-42 (describing a
recommended physical agility test designed to test the physical abilities related to the
essential functions of police officers).
318. See EEOC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 11, at § 1630.14 (a) app.; supra
notes 9-13 and accompanying text; cf EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, su-
pra note 13, § 4.4, IV-5 (explaining that employers must demonstrate that an indi-
vidual could not have met the standard with reasonable accommodation).
319. See EEOC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 11, at § 1630.14 (a) app.; see
also Michelle H. Cash & Elizabeth A. Hall, The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Employment Physicals, Drug Testing, and Reasonable Accommodation, 30 Hous.
LAW. 22 (1992) (discussing the restrictions on post-offer medical exams).
320. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12114(d)(2). See generally id. § 12114(d)(2) (defining the term
"illegal use of drugs").
321. Id. § 12114(d)(1); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(c); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain
Conference Resort, 920 F. Supp. 1153, 1154-55 (D. Colo. 1996); EEOC, TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 6.1, 8.9. But cf. EEOC, ADA EN.
FORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 17 (stating that an employer may not
conduct a pre-offer alcohol test because it would be a medical test).
[Vol. 30:977
NO ONE IS ABOVE THE LAW
test is not a medical exam, employers may administer drug tests at
any stage of the hiring process.
Although employers are free to require applicants to submit
to pre-offer drug tests, employers should not yet ask applicants to
reveal information pertaining to lawful drug use.3 " While the drug
tests should be aimed at detecting illegal drug use, it is under-
standable that the tests also might inadvertently reveal informa-
tion about lawful drug use. In the event the tests detect lawful
drug use or an underlying disability, the employer is obligated to
keep such information confidential. 2'
In cases where an applicant tests positive for apparent illegal
drug use, the employer will need to validate the results.324 In par-
ticular, the results can only be validated by requesting that the
applicant reveal information about his or her lawful use of drugs
and then determining whether the newly disclosed medications
were responsible for the positive test results. This situation, how-
ever, presents somewhat of a predicament in light of the prohibi-
tion against disability and disability-related pre-offer inquiries.3
Even though the EEOC inconsistently has taken the position that
an employer may request information about lawful drug use at the
pre-offer stage in order to validate a positive drug test resultY2 this
position directly contradicts the prohibition against making pre-
offer disability and disability-related inquiries. The best approach
would be for the employer simply to avoid the uncertainty of this
issue by electing to delay conducting any drug testing until the
post-offer stage.
5. Polygraph examinations
Currently, polygraph examinations are widely used by law en-
forcement agencies. 27 The federal government has been especially
322. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
323. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(c)(3); supra note 277 and accompanying text.
324. If an employer elected not to validate the test, a disabled applicant who
failed the test because of his or her use of a particular prescription medication could
allege disability discrimination.
325. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
326. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 11. But see
EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 13, § 8.9, VIII-7 (suggesting
that employers conduct drug tests after making an offer so as to avoid making pre-
offer disability inquiries).
327. Charles R. Honts et al., Mental and Physical Countermeasures Reduce the Ac-
curacy of Polygraph Tests, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 252 (1994); see Anderson v.
Philadelphia, 845 F. 2d 1216, 1223 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that "approximately 50% of
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known to incorporate polygraph testing into its hiring process as
"[v]ital decisions concerning who should have access to cryptology,
government secrets, and nuclear command and control have
largely been based on polygraph test results."3 s
Although administering a polygraph examination is not
equivalent to conducting a traditional medical examination, most
law enforcement agencies should consider foregoing the admini-
stration of a polygraph examination until the post-offer stage.329
Law enforcement agencies should consider such action in light of
the fact that the applicant legally cannot be asked whether he or
she is taking any prescription medications that might influence the
accuracy of the polygraph examination.30 This restriction results
from the general prohibition against both disability and disability-
related inquiries at the pre-offer stage.331 In the event an agency
elects to go ahead and conduct the examination without knowing
whether the examinee is taking prescription medications, it might
be forced to re-administer the test at the post-offer stage (that is, if
it wants to confirm the accuracy of the test after learning that the
examinee was in fact taking medication at the time of the original
exam).
332
Prior to administering a pre-offer polygraph examination, a
polygraph examiner also may not ask the applicant whether he or
she has a medical condition that could influence the examination
or endanger the health of the applicant.33  The testing agency,
police departments throughout the nation" rely upon pre-employment polygraph
screening); Ash, supra note 284, at 265 (reporting that 56.5% of the responding law
enforcement agencies use the polygraph in the hiring process); Billy Dickson, Pre-
Employment Polygraph Screening of Police Applicants, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL.,
Apr. 1986, at 7 ("Polygraph examinations have become a very important part of the
police applicant screening process and are used by law enforcement agencies
throughout the United States.").
328. Honts et al., supra note 327, at 252. See generally Stehney v. Perry, 101 F. 3d
925, 937 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The government contends that polygraph examinations are
a useful investigatory tool not only because they assist in distinguishing between
truthful and deceptive persons, but because they induce examinees to make more
comprehensive disclosures that are useful in an investigation.").
329. See EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 17.
330. See id.
331. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
332. But cf Charles R. Honts, Interpreting Research on Polygraph Countermea-
sures, 15 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 204 (1987) ("Several studies have explored the
effects of drugs on detection of deception, and have generally found them to be inef-
fective countermeasures.").
333. See Sharp, supra note 230, at 911 (describing prohibited questions during a
pre-offer polygraph).
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however, could require -that the examinee agree to waive any li-
ability against the agency for any adverse medical consequences
resulting from the administration of the test.334 The testing agency
also could provide the applicant with a description of the poly-
graph examination and require the applicant to produce medical
documentation indicating clearance to take the exam. 335 Besides
being unable to ask about legal drug use and health issues affecting
the test itself, the law enforcement agency would be restricted in
terms of the pre-offer questions that could be asked during the ac-
tual exam.35 For example, the employer could not ask the appli-
cant about how many times he or she has ever used illegal drugs.337
Likewise, it would be illegal to ask how often the applicant be-
comes intoxicated. The restriction against asking specific ques-
tions about drug and alcohol use is very significant because law en-
forcement agencies are often particularly concerned about an
applicant's drug and alcohol problems.338 Just as important, the
employer would be unable to use the pre-offer polygraph as a
means to ensure the applicant had disclosed all relevant medical
information and records due to the basic fact that the applicant
should not yet have been required to reveal such information.
For the most part, these issues can be avoided by simply
waiting until the post-offer stage to administer the polygraph ex-
amination. Employers should realize, however, that they will be
subject to greater scrutiny whenever a disabled applicant is re-
jected following a post-offer polygraph.39 This increased scrutiny
results from the fact that the revocation of the offer of employ-
ment will coincide with the employer's newly acquired knowledge
about the applicant's disability.
As much as possible, employers would be prudent to take rea-
334. Cf supra note 314-15 and accompanying text.
335. Cf supra note 314 and accompanying text.
336. See generally Dickson, supra note 327, at 8-9 (during the pre-test interview,
the Florida Highway Patrol questions applicants about such issues as "medical and
mental health," "drinking habits," and "use and sale of illegal drugs").
337. See generally William Nardini, The Polygraph Technique: An Overview, 15 J.
POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 239, 240 (1987) (explaining that pre-employment polygraph
examinations often are used "to verify information contained in a job application,
and to learn if some negative relevant information has been omitted").
338. See id.
339. See generally EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 230, at 18-
19 (explaining that in cases where a withdrawal follows both a post-offer security
clearance and medical exam, close scrutiny is required in order to determine whether
the medical exam was the actual reason for the withdrawal).
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sonable steps to ensure that any information disclosed in the post-
offer medical examination is not passed on to those individuals re-
sponsible for administering the polygraph examination. For in-
stance, the polygraph examiner could simply ask the applicant if he
or she truthfully and fully provided all the previously requested
medical information and records. Furthermore, the polygraph ex-
aminer would not need to be informed that the applicant revealed
that he or she has been diagnosed with a particular disease or ail-
ment. Arguably, all the examiner would need to know is whether
the applicant has been medically cleared to take the exam and
whether he or she is taking any medications that could influence
the test.
By taking these sorts of basic precautions, an employer will be
in a better position to claim that the employment offer was re-
voked solely because of the applicant's failure to pass the poly-
graph exam. The employer will also be in a better position to de-
fend the integrity of the exam as well as show that the polygraph
examiner was not biased against the disabled applicant.
VI. CONCLUSION
While it is true that law enforcement agencies are given a
great deal of leeway in making employment decisions, they no
longer have authority to discriminate against individuals with dis-
abilities. Despite initial fears by critics of the ADA and Rehabili-
tation Act, law enforcement agencies have not been forced to em-
ploy individuals who are not qualified or capable of doing the
job.m Moreover, law enforcement agencies have been neither re-
quired to tolerate dishonest or illegal behavior nor compelled to
accommodate individuals posing a direct threat to themselves or
the public they are expected to protect. Only with the passage of
340. See John A. Leonard, The Americans with Disabilities Act, FBI L. EN-
FORCEMENT BULL., June 1993, at 22, 23 (stating that "the employment provisions of
the ADA do not reduce or eliminate selection criteria-the law simply attempts to
offer equal employment opportunities to qualified individuals with certain disabili-
ties"); Daniel L. Schofield, Hiring Standards: Ensuring Fitness for Duty, FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Nov. 1993, at 27, 28 (explaining that law enforcement agen-
cies are not required to hire or retain persons who are physically unable to perform
the job); Robin Topping, Around the Island Crime & Courts, NEWSDAY, Feb. 6,
1996, at A44 (quoting Karl Kampe, executive director of the Nassau County, New
York Civil Service Commission, regarding the initial attitudes of law enforcement
agencies after the passage of the ADA, "There was a lot of fear-a fear that both the
prospective applicant and the public would be exposed to more danger ... [but] I
don't think the fears have proven to be the fact.").
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time will more litigation further clarify the effects of the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act upon law enforcement agencies. In the
meantime, employing law enforcement agencies should look to the
statutes themselves, the applicable implementing regulations, and
existing case law for guidance, while also being ever mindful of the
intent behind these federal antidiscrimination laws. At the same
time, law enforcement agencies must remain vigilant to the prem-
ise that they themselves are not above the law.34
341. Although many law enforcement officers and administrators might view the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act as nothing more than bureaucratic meddling in the
affairs of law enforcement, those same individuals need to be reminded of the fact
that no one can predict when he or she might be either injured on or off duty or in-
flicted with a life-altering medical condition. Most cynics probably would view the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act somewhat differently if they were a highly deco-
rated, 15-year veteran officer or agent facing an unexpected and unjustified termina-
tion following an injury incurred in the line of duty.
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